



The *JIHAD* Frame in Holy Qur'an and NOW: A Contrastive Critical Discourse Analytic Study

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Abstract:

The present paper aims at framing the concept of *JIHAD* in the light of Barsalou's (1992b) Frame Theory. Originally a religious concept; *JIHAD* has been recently used in a multitude of contexts by a variety of, mostly conflicting, parties. The researcher analyses the corpora under investigation to create contrastive semantic frames of the concept of *JIHAD* as represented in the Holy Qur'an- as a reference corpus- and NOW (2010-2016)-as a parallel corpus. As Barsalou points out, "a frame provides the fundamental representation of knowledge in human recognition" (1992, p.21). These frames are to highlight the basic co-occurring attributes and values of the concept of *JIHAD*. The NOW-based frame is further studied in the light of critical discourse analysis (CDA), and more precisely in the light of Van Dijk's (2006) model of triangulated manipulation. Cognitively, Dijk sees "manipulation as mind control [which] involves the interference with processes of understanding, the formation of biased mental models and social representations such as knowledge and ideologies" (p. 359). The researcher concludes that in the NOW-based *JIHAD* frame, the values of the relevant attributes are differently instantiated from those of the Qur'an-based frame. Considering that the Qur'an provides the prototypical attribute values, these variations in instantiation is proven as ideologically-driven; hence an instance of manipulation.

Keywords: Semantic frame, discourse and manipulation, *JIHAD*, Holy Qur'an, media discourse

1. Introduction:

The present paper aims at constructing a semantic frame of the concept of *JIHAD* as represented in the Holy Qur'an and selected online media discourse. *JIHAD* as an originally religious concept is defined as "exerting efforts to spread Islam and defend it" ("Mu'gam alfath al qur'an al kareem"). Nevertheless, in recent years, and with the rising waves of terrorism as a world-wide phenomenon, the term 'jihad' has been excessively used in a variety of discourse genres, not quite relevant to its originally religious one. In fact, *JIHAD*, with all its relevant derivatives: jihad, jihadism, jihadi, and jihadist, feature in current media discourse with remarkable frequency. As the researcher's primary analysis has shown, the meaning of *JIHAD* in areligious discourse is considerably different from, if not opposite to, that which constitutes its basic attributes. It is postulated that this deviation is ideologically driven in public discourse, in general, and media discourse, in particular.

It is this wide gap between the meaning of the concept in its religious context and that used in media discourse context that triggered the initial interest in this study. Being a concept, rather than a physical entity, an accurate definition of *JIHAD* could be the first step towards bridging the aforementioned gap. Accurately defining concepts, however, has never been an easy task for linguists, in general, or semanticists, in particular. As Barsalou and Wiener-Hastings (2005) have pointed, specifying the 'content of abstract concepts' poses a problem for any semantic theory of knowledge. Meanwhile, "a word for an abstract concept may trigger highly associated words" (p.131).

Therefore, the present paper frames the concept of *JIHAD* in the light of Barsalou's (1992b) Frame theory. A typical frame consisting of a co-occurring set of attributes and values of the concept of *JIHAD* is constructed based on its use in the verses of the Holy Qur'an -as a reference corpus- and a multi-million-word electronic corpus of news on the web- NOW- as a parallel corpus, covering the period (2010-2016). The variations in the NOW-based frame is further examined in the construct of Dijk's (2006) approach to manipulative discourse. According to Dijk, manipulation implies the exercise of a form of illegitimate influence by means of discourse. In his model of triangulated manipulation, Dijk posits that manipulation is done socially, cognitively, and discursively via discourse. Hence, the analysis of the parallel corpus targets highlighting the ideologically-driven deviations in the meaning of the concept in the selected media discourse.

2. Objectives of the study:

The present study falls under the category of cognitive-based studies, primarily aiming at constructing an attribute-value frame of *JIHAD*. The paper attempts to answer the following questions:

1. What are the basic attributes and their bound values of the frame of *JIHAD* as represented in the selected verses of Holy Qur'an?
2. What are the basic attributes and their bound values of the frame of *JIHAD* as represented in NOW?
3. What are the major attribute/value differences between the two investigated corpora?
4. Considering that the Holy Qur'an is the original source of the term, what are the reasons behind any sort of deviation in the representation of the term in media discourse as instantiated by NOW?
5. How can these deviations be analysed in the light of Dijk's (2006) approach to manipulative discourse?

3. Theoretical framework:

3.1 Barsalou's Frame Theory:

As Barsalou (1999) suggests "abstract concepts are not really abstract, they are simply complex and temporally extended. Whereas more concrete concepts index well-specified objects, actions and properties in situations, abstract concepts index complex configurations of information distributed over multiple modalities and over time" (p.62).

Drawing upon previous frame theories (Fillmore, 1985; Shank and Abelson, 1977; Hayes, 1979) as well as others, Barsalou (1992b) introduced his Frame Theory where he proposes that "frames provide the fundamental representation of knowledge in human cognition" (p.21). In fact, Barsalou (1992b) contends that "[h]uman conceptual knowledge appears to be frames all the way down" (p.40). A frame is "a co-occurring set of multivalued attributes that are integrated by structural invariants" (Barsalou & Hale, 1993, p.126). A frame of a knowledge unit has three fundamental components: attributes and values, structural invariants and constraints. At their core, "frames contain attribute-value sets" (Barsalou, 1992b, p. 43). Indeed, this description of the internal structure of the frame is one of the major contributions of Barsalou to frame semantics.

Barsalou assumes that a set of "co-occurring attributes constitutes the core of the frame [where] an attribute is a concept that describes an aspect of at least some category members" (p. 30). So, for instance, as elaborated by Barsalou, when one comes to think of the frame of *CAR*, *engine*, *fuel*, and *driver* are three of the basic attributes. So, fuel, in this example, is an *aspect* of the car's category. These are further instantiated in different values such as *4 cylinder*, *gasoline* and *Liz* respectively. A value is "a subordinate concept of an attribute" (p.31). Hence, gasoline is a *type* of fuel, and so on. A concept, in this respect, defines the main cognitive representation of a category; representations including "definitional information, prototypical

information, functionally important information” (p. 31). A value can be an attribute for further detailed values, and so on.

Barsalou defines *structure invariants* as the kind of relation that exists between “exemplars of a concept, providing relevantly invariant structures between attributes” (1992, p.35). These are a kind of relatively constant relations between the attributes of a frame, such as the relation between the driver who *controls* the engine, the seat which *has* a back, the motive *behind* the murder, etc. It includes a wide variety of relations such as temporal relations, spatial relations, causal relations, instrumental relations, etc.

Finally, Barsalou sees constraints as a kind of relations that “produce systematic variability in attribute values” (1992b, p.37). They denote the kind of contingencies between attribute values which differ from one instance to another. As put by Barsalou and Hale (1993), “the value of one frame attribute constrains the values of another.... Whereas structural invariants capture relatively constant relations between attributes across a concept’s instances...constraints capture contingencies between attribute-values that vary widely from instance to instance” (p. 128). It is this feature of the frame which allows variation and flexibility in conceptualizing the frame in different contexts.

Barsalou’s theory has been particularly chosen as the model which the present study adopts, because Barsalou’s frames are “dynamic relational structures whose form is flexible and context dependent” (1992b, p.21). That is to say, the variation in the instantiation of the attributes and their bound values can be easily understood, justified, and examined in the light of the respective context. As illustrated by Barsalou, “when new aspects of exemplars become relevant in novel contexts, people may construct new attributes to represent them” (p. 34). This is indeed what takes place in media discourse under investigation; where new attributes, and their bound values are constructed by writers of the articles.

One particular feature of the theory is relevant in this respect. Opposite to a number of previous theories, Barsalou’s theory assumes that frames “do not contain rigid sets of attributes.... On one occasion, one subset of a concept’s attributes may be bound to an instance; on another occasion, a different set of attributes might be bound” (1993, p. 126). Being partially context-dependent, attributes are not fixed across different contexts. Therefore, people -with different cognitive backgrounds- construct varied attributes, with specific features becoming bound to the relevant frame attributes as values. This feature of Barsalou’s theory is of direct relevance to the present paper. In fact, it describes why a standard definition/ representation of *JIHAD* is a negotiable issue. As Barsalou points out: “if two people represent a category with different attributes, they encode its exemplars differently. Different aspects of the exemplar are

relevant, because the perceivers' respective frames orient perception to different information" (1992, p.34). Relevant here is Barsalou's notion of attribute systematicity, which purports that in a particular frame, an attribute most likely co-occurs with other attributes; which in turn form the core of the frame and are rather stable across different contexts. This co-occurrence produces a kind of "associative strength", hence these attributes become "integrated in memory to form an established structure" (p.35). This salience of the role of 'memory' in forming mental models and representations of concepts is a major link between Barsalou's theory and the second adopted model, i.e. Van Dijk's (2006) approach to manipulation.

3.2 Dijk's (2006) manipulative discourse:

In an attempt to complement his critical discourse analysis (CDA) model presented (1998, 2001), and more precisely the notion of manipulation, which constitutes a core notion in this model, Dijk (2006) offers a 'triangulated approach to manipulation as a form of social power abuse, cognitive mind control and discursive interaction" (p.359). In this approach, Dijk posits that "socially, manipulation is defined as illegitimate domination confirming social inequality. Cognitively, manipulation as mind control involves the interference with processes of understanding, the formation of biased mental models and social representations such as knowledge and ideologies. Discursively, manipulation generally involves the usual forms and formats of ideological discourse" (p.359).

Dijk sets off with assigning certain social factors for manipulation; namely the dimension of social relationship between the manipulator and the manipulated. As per Dijk, this relationship necessitates a particular positioning of the manipulator in relation to the manipulated, as well as having access to particular discourse genres, inaccessible to the manipulator. This is typical of those who have access to media discourse as with the case of the present study. Through influencing their audience, manipulators, or those who have more social power and dominance, carry out this manipulation via their respective institutions; namely media, with the ultimate aim of reproducing their power (Dijk, 2006, p. 363). Dijk specifies one particular form of social manipulation which is providing "incomplete or otherwise biased information" to the readers to influence their judgement on a particular communicative event. This is typically the case with selected news corpus under investigation, where not all values of the attributes of the frame are presented. As put by Dijk, "manipulation, socially speaking, is a discursive form of elite power reproduction that is against the best interests of dominated groups and (re)produces social inequality" (p.364).

As noted earlier, Dijk sees manipulation, first and foremost, a cognitive process of mind control, which in turn controls their actions. He sees this mental control as a multi-stepped process starting with: a) manipulating short-term memory (STM) by assigning particular salience to one part, rather than the other, of a discourse text. This directly affects "the

management of strategic understanding in STM”, hence understanding would be incomplete or biased. Applying this to the present corpus would reveal that certain lexical choices are recurrently made in association with *JIHAD*, hence being more accessible to STM. Mind control also involves b) episodic manipulation, which involves manipulating the cognitive mental models of recipients, which are basically individual, by relating certain discourse texts with certain mental models in long term(LT) and episodic memory (Dijk, 2006, p. 367). It is this mental model that is the basis of our future memories, as well as the basis of further learning, such as the acquisition of experience-based knowledge, attitudes and ideologies. Third and most importantly, Dijk views that mind control involves c) manipulating social cognition, which relates to gearing discourses towards manipulating recipients into more long-term, shared attitudes, beliefs and ideologies. “Manipulation will generally focus on social cognition, and hence on groups of people, rather than on individuals and their unique personal models. It is also in this sense that manipulation is a discursive practice that involves both cognitive and social dimensions” (p.369).

Dijk reviews a number of the cognitive strategies of manipulation, of which the researcher highlights the ones that are most applicable to the present study, namely:

- 1) Generalization: by generalizing feelings, impressions or attitudes of individuals, the manipulator turns these into socially shared ideologies, turning them into socially stable representations.
- 2) Using vague expressions, implicitness, euphemism, etc. to make sure that the ‘biases’, ‘misguided’ or ‘partial’ knowledge is acquired.
- 3) Changing social representation by forming script-like structures of unfavoured people or groups.
- 4) Topic selection: emphasizing positive/negative topics about Us/Them.
- 5) Local meanings: give many/few details, be general/specific, be vague/precise, be explicit/implicit
- 6) Lexicon: select positive words for Us, negative words for Them.
- 7) Incomplete or lack of relevant knowledge (Dijk, 2006, pp. 370-375).

This is typically the case with the *JIHAD* frame, where one or two attributes only of *JIHAD* are highlighted whereas the others are backgrounded, which discursively assigns readers a passive role or what Dijk calls “victims of manipulation”. Another quite influential manipulation strategy used in the present data, is the tool of foregrounding and backgrounding. Media discourse intentionally foregrounds one particular attribute of *JIHAD*, backgrounding all the other equally used notions.

Dijk sums up his argument on manipulative discourse

these general strategies of manipulative discourse appear to be largely semantic, i.e. focused on manipulating the ‘content’ of text and talk.

However, as is the case for the implementation of ideologies, these preferred meanings may also be emphasized and de-emphasized in the usual ways, as explained: by (de-)topicalization of meanings, by specific speech acts, more or less precise or specific local meanings, manipulating explicit vs implicit information, lexicalization, metaphors and other rhetorical figures as well as specific expression and realization (2006, p.376).

4. Methodology:

The present paper adopts a quantitative-qualitative contrastive analysis of the data under scrutiny. First, the researcher starts with the Qur'an as the reference corpus, where the Qur'anic verses (*ayat*) including the root JAHADA and its derivatives are cited and a Systemic Functional Grammar (SFG) Transitivity analysis of the main participant roles and circumstances is done. Second, a semantic frame of the concept *JIHAD* is constructed. The next step is to carry a corpus-based analysis of *JIHAD* in the English corpus, i.e. NOW. The selected corpus covers the period (2010-2016). Noteworthy is that a Transitivity analysis is not possible since all derivatives of *JIHAD* are nominalized, rather than used as verb forms. Accordingly, a similar analysis to the one done on the Arabic corpus is not valid. This step is followed by constructing a semantic frame of *JIHAD* as represented via the English corpus.

A contrastive analysis of the two semantic frames is carried out to highlight the major differences between the two frames, putting into consideration that the Qur'an provides the reference corpus. Finally, a critical discourse analysis of these differences is done on the English corpus, to validate the ideologically-driven variations.

5. Source of Data:

The corpus under scrutiny comprises two main sources: first, the Holy Qur'an as translated by Pickthall (1930). The focus is on the verses where *JIHAD* or its derivatives are cited. This represents the reference corpus. The second source is NOW electronic corpus. "The NOW corpus (News on the Web) contains 4.9 billion words of data from web-based newspapers and magazines from 2010 to the present time" ("NOW"). This represents the parallel corpus.

6. Literature Review:

Defining words and identifying their basic content have been one of the primary tasks of linguists with their varied specialties: lexicography, semantics, psycholinguistics as well as the most recent cognitive semantics approach. With concrete words, the job is straightforward. However, when it comes to abstract concepts, the attempts to define words have become much more challenging. There have been various approaches/models for defining words starting with the feature list, modal versus amodal representation, moving to frame semantics as well as others. Most researches agree that "the word for an abstract concept may trigger highly associated words. Because no situation comes to mind immediately, other

associated information becomes active” (Barsalou and Hlaxtings, 2005, p.131). Work on framing concepts is attributed to the pioneering work of Charles Fillmore (1977, 1982) on Frame Semantics, where the notion of defining words in terms of frames was first set as a cognitive model. “By the term ‘frame’ I have in mind any system of concepts related in such a way that to understand any of them you have to understand the whole structure in which it fits; when one of the things in such a structure is introduced into a text, or into a conversation, all of the other things are automatically made available.” (Fillmore, 1982, p. 111). According to Fillmore, this model of analysis of words’ meanings aims at “emphasizing the continuities, rather than the discontinuities, between language and experience” (p. 113). Linking the meaning of words to world experience primarily contextualizes it, encoding the knowledge [that] is grounded in human interaction with others and with the world. In Frame Semantics, a word is defined in relation to its underlying frame, not in relation to other words.

Moving to work on manipulative discourse, research has been done within a variety of disciplines such as media studies, politics, psychology as well as linguistics and particularly CDA studies. Asya (2013) overviews the various types and strategies of manipulation in general and linguistic manipulation in particular, highlighting the theory of speech manipulation, with special emphasis on society-oriented manipulation where “the speaker doesn’t construct the image of a separate listener, but creates generalized image of a group as a whole” (p. 80). Kenzhekanova et al. (2015) focus more precisely on manipulation in political discourse of mass media, highlighting the tools of speech manipulation (TSM) on the phonographic, lexical, grammatical as well as lexical-pragmatic levels. Ali, M.A. and Omar, A. (2016) have investigated the role of manipulative discourse in media representation of Russian military intervention in Syria, with special focus of headlines and lead stories. Results of the study show how the linguistic structures used in the Russia Today (RT) and the CNN reflect the different ideologies presented by both cable networks towards this intervention. Khudhayir (2013) discusses the main linguistic devices used in manipulation of meaning in political discourse; where he examines the use of ‘essentially contested concepts’, ‘deep and shallow processing’ as well as ‘presupposition’ in political discourse as lexical and semantic strategies of manipulation.

Looking at *JIHAD* as a lexeme, realized in its various derivatives, it occurred in the Holy Qur’an 34 times. It is one of the most commonly debated terms both linguistically and jurisdictionally. The focus of the researcher in the present work is on the linguistic meaning of the word, as presented by different interpreters (*mufasereen*) of the verses of the Holy Qur’an. Most interpreters of the word agreed that it is basically a religious,

rather than a secular term, and here lies a major difference between *JIHAD* and war. Al-Alosy (1932) defined *JIHAD* as primarily “exerting effort to combat enemies....and it is of three major types: fighting those who disbelieve, fighting devil (ash-aitan) and fighting oneself against desires, which is prioritized over fighting enemies” (1932). *JIHAD* -defined as fighting- is also of two main types: the offensive *JIHAD* (*JIHAD* At-talab), and the defensive *JIHAD* (*JIHAD* ad-daf’). As evident from the names, the former type is the one which includes assault on others (disbelievers, hypocrites, atheists, etc.), whereas the latter involves fighting back those who attack believers. Offensive *JIHAD* is the kind of fighting Muslims are ordered to go through in order to defend their religion, newly-acquired Islamic territories, themselves against assaults, etc. This is the type of *JIHAD* that is primarily mentioned as *JIHAD* for the sake of God. This type of *JIHAD* entails the use of either self or money.

In Arabic, the word *jihad* is a derivative of the lexeme JAHADA { ج ه د }, which is defined as 1) pursued and tried ardently, and 2) exerted utmost effort (al mo’gam alwaseet). The derivatives of this lexeme range from *jahada*, *jihad*, *mujahada*, *mujahid*, *mujahad*. In Islamic jurisprudence, the concept of *JIHAD* has attracted the attention of men of different interests, starting with interpreters, jurists, as well as preachers and others. Among the most famous interpreters who worked on this concept are At-Tabari. Ibn-Katheer, Aq-Qurtubi as well as Al-Aloosi. Looking at how these interpreters dealt with the term, it can be said that almost all verses dealt with what might be called defensive *JIHAD* rather than offensive *JIHAD*.

In the following section, the analysis of *JIHAD* is done to construct a contrastive semantic frame.

7. Analysis:

a. *JIHAD* in Holy Qur’an:

As previously mentioned, the lexeme *JIHAD* and its different derivatives are cited 34 times across 15 chapters (surah) in the Holy Qur’an. The meaning of two of these citations in (Al-Ankabut (8) and Loqman (15), is totally irrelevant as they deal with parents striving to divert their offspring from following the instructions of Allah. Hence these two instances would not be accounted for in the following analysis.

As elaborated in the Methodology above, an SFG Transitivity analysis of the verses is done so as to highlight the main participants and circumstances of the process *JIHAD*. A detailed analysis is attached in the Appendix 1. For elaboration, a select number of verses have been chosen which represent the most frequently used collocates with *JIHAD*, with its different syntactic-semantic realizations. For example:

١. تَوَمَّنُونَ بِاللَّهِ وَرَسُولِهِ وَتَجَاهِدُونَ فِي سَبِيلِ اللَّهِ بِأَمْوَالِكُمْ وَأَنْفُسِكُمْ ذَلِكَ خَيْرٌ لَكُمْ إِنْ كُنْتُمْ تَعْلَمُونَ (الصف: ١١)

Ye should believe in Allah and His messenger, and should strive (*tujahiduna* (do *JIHAD*) for the cause of Allah with your wealth and your lives. That is better for you, if ye did but know. (61.11).

| Process | Participant | | Circumstance | |
|-----------------|-------------|-------|----------------------------|-----------------------|
| | Actor | Goal | Manner-means | Cause- purpose |
| Do <i>JIHAD</i> | Believers | ----- | With wealth and your lives | For the sake of Allah |

Fig.1

٢. الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا وَهَاجَرُوا وَجَاهَدُوا فِي سَبِيلِ اللَّهِ بِأَمْوَالِهِمْ وَأَنْفُسِهِمْ أَكْبَرُ دَرَجَةً عِنْدَ اللَّهِ وَأُولَئِكَ هُمُ الْفَائِزُونَ (التوبة: ٢٠)

Those who believe, and have left their homes and striven (*jahadu* (did *JIHAD*) with their wealth and their lives in Allah's way are of much greater worth in Allah's sight. These are they who are triumphant. (9.20).

| Process | Participant | | Circumstance | |
|------------------|--------------------|-------|----------------------------|-----------------------|
| | Actor | Goal | Manner-means | Cause- purpose |
| Did <i>JIHAD</i> | Those who believed | ----- | With wealth and your lives | For the sake of Allah |

Fig. 2

٣. وَمَنْ جَاهَدَ فَإِنَّمَا يُجَاهِدُ لِنَفْسِهِ إِنَّ اللَّهَ لَغَنِيٌّ عَنِ الْعَالَمِينَ (العنكبوت: ٦)

And whosoever striveth (*yujahidu*) (does *JIHAD*), striveth (does *JIHAD*) only for himself, for lo! Allah is altogether Independent of (His) creatures. (29.6).

| Process | Participant | | Circumstance | |
|-------------------|-------------|-------|---------------|----------------|
| | Actor | Goal | Manner- means | Cause- purpose |
| Does <i>JIHAD</i> | He [who...] | ----- | ----- | For oneself |

Fig. 3

٤. وَلَنَبْلُوَنَّكُمْ حَتَّى نَعْلَمَ الْمُجَاهِدِينَ مِنْكُمْ وَالصَّابِرِينَ وَنَبْلُوَنَّكُمْ أَخْبَارَكُمْ (محمد: ٣١)

And verily We shall try you till We know those of you who strive hard (*al-mujahidina* (those who do *JIHAD*) for the cause of Allah and the steadfast, and till We test your record. (47.31).

| Process | Participant | | Circumstance | |
|-----------------|-------------|-------|---------------|----------------|
| | Actor | Goal | Manner- means | Cause- purpose |
| Do <i>JIHAD</i> | Those who [| ----- | ----- | ----- |

Fig. 4

٥. فَلَا تَطِعُوا الْكَافِرِينَ وَجَاهِدُوهُمْ بِهِ جِهَادًا كَبِيرًا (الفرقان: ٥٢)

So obey not the disbelievers, but strive against them *jahidhum* (do *JIHAD* against them) herewith with a great endeavor. (25.52)

It is noteworthy that the translation of this verse lacks the prepositional phrase ‘with it’ (*bihi*), which has been interpreted by most interpreters as ‘with the Qur’an’.

| Process | Participant | | Circumstance | |
|-----------------|------------------|--------------|--------------|---------------|
| | Actor | Goal | Manner-means | Cause-purpose |
| Do <i>JIHAD</i> | Prophet Muhammad | Disbelievers | Qur’an | ----- |

Fig. 5

٦. يَا أَيُّهَا النَّبِيُّ جَاهِدِ الْكُفَّارَ وَالْمُنَافِقِينَ وَاغْلُظْ عَلَيْهِمْ وَمَأْوَاهُمْ جَهَنَّمُ ۗ وَبئسَ الْمَصِيرُ (التحریم ٩)

O Prophet! Strive *jahid* (do *JIHAD*) against the disbelievers and the hypocrites, and be stern with them. Hell will be their home, a hapless journey's end.(66.9)

| Process | Participant | | Circumstance | |
|-----------------|------------------|-----------------------------|--------------|----------------|
| | Actor | Goal | Manner-means | Cause- purpose |
| Do <i>JIHAD</i> | Prophet Muhammad | Disbelievers and hypocrites | ----- | ----- |

Fig. 6

Analysing all 32 instances of occurrence of *JIHAD* and its derivatives yield the following results:

| Transitivity element | Instance | Frequency | |
|----------------------|--|-----------|--|
| Process | Do/does/ did <i>JIHAD</i> | 32 | |
| Participant | Those who believe/d | 13 | |
| Actor | Muhammed | 2 | |
| Goal | Disbelievers | 2 | |
| | Hypocrites | 1 | |
| Circumstance | Manner-means With wealth and your lives | 11 | |
| | By Qur’an | 1 | |
| | Cause- purpose: For the sake of Allah | 15 | |
| | Cause- purpose: For one’s own sake | 1 | |

Table 1

The most common collocates with *JIHAD* are:

| Transitivity element | Frequency |
|---------------------------------------|-----------|
| Cause- purpose: for the sake of Allah | 15 |

| | |
|--------------------------------------|----|
| (God) | |
| Manner- means: with wealth and lives | 11 |
| Actor: those who believe/d | 13 |

Table 2

Based on the above, the following frame of the concept of *JIHAD* can be done:




Fig. 7

Looking at the devised frame, the following could be concluded. The main *attributes* of the *JIHAD* frame include *actor*, *means*, *goal* and *cause/purpose*. These attributes adopt the following values respectively: *those who believe/d* (13), *jihadis* (3), and *Prophet Muhammad* (2) in order of frequency of occurrence. The aspects of the attribute *cause* adopt the values: *for the sake of Allah* (15), *for one's sake* (1). *wealth* (11), *lives* (11), and *Qur'an* (1) are values for the aspect *means*. Finally, the *goal* attribute adopts the value *disbelievers* (1) and *hypocrites* (1).

The major structural invariants are *instrumental relation* between *actor* and *means*. Also, the *intentional relation* between *actor* and *motive*.

In the following section, an analysis of JIHAD in the parallel corpus - NOW- is carried out, followed by constructing a contrastive semantic frame of the concept.

6.2 JIHAD in NOW

In this section, the lexeme JIHAD with its four derivatives, *jihad*, *jihadism*, *jihadi(s)* and *jihadist(s)* are investigated in the parallel corpus NOW (News on the Web). This multi-million-word, open-access corpus, which includes thousands of news texts compiled from the web, has 5 major analysis tools: List, Chart, Collocates, Compare and KWIC. Each corpus tool enables the researcher to look into more than one feature of the selected word/phrase. List gives a list of the frequencies of the selected word form. Collocates display which words occur near to the selected item which gives ‘great insight into meaning and usage’ (“NOW”). Finally, KWIC (Key word in context) displays the patterns in which the selected word is used. The researcher makes use of two only of these tools; namely, the List, and Collocates tools. Each word form is examined separately, then a semantic frame of JIHAD is constructed based on the findings. The researcher starts by investigating *jihad*, then *jihadism*, then *jihadist(s)* and finally *jihadi(s)*. The most salient features of each result are reviewed, this is followed by a comprehensive account of the most salient features. Finally, and based on the findings, a semantic frame of JIHAD is constructed.

These four forms are particularly used since they represented the highest frequency within the corpus with *jihad* (15,960 hits), *jihadists* (16,871), *jihadist* (16,304), *jihadi* (9,219), and *jihadism* (1,186). A collocate analysis of each of these forms are done in the following sections. (Appendix 2)




Fig.8 List of frequencies of ‘jihad’, ‘jihadism’, ‘jihadi’ and ‘jihadist’

6.2.1 Jihad

Looking at the collocates of *jihad*, it is found that the highest frequency of collocate adjectives are: ‘armed’ (286,487 hits), ‘terrorist’ (199,864), ‘violent’ (192,899), ‘radical’ (101,632), and ‘militant’ (7,276).

These frequency hits reflect the negative representation of *JIHAD* and how it is equated with war and terrorism. Moving to the collocate verbs, it is found that the highest frequency of collocating verbs is realized by verbs like: 'fight(-ing)' (1,035,507 hits), 'join' (496,920), 'declare(-d)' (336,786), 'wage (-d/-ing)' (166,322). As for the noun collocates, the noun 'war' hits the highest frequency (1,057,117), followed by 'terrorism' (224,901), then 'terror' (186,351) and 'terrorists' (158,857). Finally, the preposition 'against' features with very high frequency amounting to (3,917,326 hits). Here are a few examples for these instances:

7. "... cancelling the passports of people suspected of planning to travel to Syria to wage violent jihad. Peace talks between US and Russia over Syria..." (The Guardian).
8. "Even if you're in Europe, wage your jihad. Allah will reward you, put an end to the filthy ones." (Daily Mail).
9. "... after Nur al-Din Mahmoud Zangi - famous for mobilising and unifying Muslim forces to wage jihad against the Christian Crusaders – who..." (BBC News).
10. "...a recruitment ring to send young French Muslims to fight jihad against U.S. forces. But Cherif was arrested the day..." (CBS News).

6.2.2 Jihadism

Moving to the second form of *JIHAD*, jihadism also collocates with adjectives that bear negative connotations; namely: 'violent' (192,899 hits), 'militant' (74,478), 'extreme' (182,413). As for collocating verbs, unlike jihad, jihadism rarely collocates with verbs; however, the highest frequencies in NOW feature with: 'fight' (677,894 hits) and 'combat' (135,598). Collocating nouns with high frequencies include: 'fighting' (367,107 hits), 'threat' (379,263) and 'terrorism' (224,901). Examples include:

11. "...Yet, the question of how to confront the seemingly ubiquitous threat of jihadism remains. That the question must be posed..." (Deutsche Welle).
12. "...We offer the template of a democratic polity and modernity to counter regressive jihadism and terrorism," he said." (India Today).
13. "... We must work to halt the spread of weapons of mass destruction; combat violent jihadism; revitalise civil societies; assist developing countries in keeping their citizen..." (Eyewitness News)
14. "...French Prime Minister Manuel Valls declared " a war against terrorism, against jihadism... against everything that is aimed at breaking fraternity..." (CNN).

6.2.3 Jihadist:

Examining the collocates of jihadist(s) reveals much of the usage and meaning of the concept in news discourse. Used as doer of jihad, jihadist(s) features with highest frequency with verbs such as: 'attack' (805,098 hits),

'killed' (787,142), 'fight' (677,894) and 'attacks' (805,730 hits). Collocating adjectives include: 'armed' (278,646 hits), 'terrorist' (194, 711), 'deadly' (108,153), and 'militant' (72,701). The tool of jihad features for the first time as a collocate for jihadist(s) where 'bombing' features as a noun modified by jihadist(s) in (35,006hits). Also, jihadist(s) modifies 'suicide' in (239,054 hits). Among high frequency-collocating nouns, 'attacks' (7783,717 hits), 'threat' (367,398), 'terrorism' (217,283), 'terror' (180,657), and 'fear' (149,428) feature most. Examples include:

15. "...rooted in the politicised version of Islam. " Winning takes more than bombing the jihadists from the air: " Killing terrorists is great. If you can't capture...." (Telegraph.co.uk).

16. "... killings as well as not less than 28000 unarmed Christians killed by Nomad Fulani Jihadists between June 2015 and January 2017...." (The ChronichleHerald.ca)

17. "...Tunisia has been the target of a wave of deadly jihadist attacks since its 2011 revolution, including on foreign tourists, and...." (News 24).

18. "... They entered Sirte itself on June 9, and the jihadists hit back with suicide bombings and snipers...." (Manilla Bulletin).

6.2.4 Jihadi

This form of JIHAD also features as modifying to nouns that include: 'attacks' (805,730 hits), 'violence' (542,188), 'terrorism' (224,901), 'cells' (179,839), 'gunmen' (36591) as well as others. The two high-frequency modifiers of *jihadi* as a noun are: 'banned' (204,828) and 'violent' (187,054). The only verb that collocate with *jihadi* is: 'beheaded' (8,597 hits). For example:

19. "...Hundreds of thousands of people are killed by radical jihadi's, that are FUNDED BY OUR SO-CALLED...." (Voice of America).

20. "... on red alert over the possibility of simultaneous ISIS attacks. # Last month jihadi gunmen slaughtered 130 people in a bloody massacre in Paris...." (Express.co.uk)

21. "... During its investigation, the committee found instances of terror recruitment videos for banned jihadi and neo-Nazi groups remaining accessible online...." (The Guardian).

22. "...The ABKS expresses its deep concern over the incessant rise of violence by jihadi elements in the state; the prodding of anti-national elements...." (India Today).

6.2.5 Semantic Frame of JIHAD:

Drawing on the findings of the collocates of JIHAD and its four selected derivatives, a semantic frame can be constructed that includes three main attributes: *actor*, *means*, and *goal*. The *cause* attribute could not be accurately extracted from the data, although it can be assumed that *terror* and *fear* could be possible values.




Fig. 9

7. Findings:

Looking at the frequency and collocation results of the examined data, followed by contrasting the constructed semantic frames of *JIHAD* in the selected corpora, it can be concluded that there are semantic differences between the use of the concept in the reference corpus (i.e. Holy Qur'an) and NOW. These differences can be summarized in the following points:

- 1) Both corpora instantiate the *actor*, *means*, *goal* attributes. The reference corpus, however, further instantiates the *purpose/cause* attribute, which could not be easily extracted from NOW.
- 2) The structural variants in both data are similar; where the *actor* 'uses' the *means*, and the *actor* 'targets' the *goal*.
- 3) The significant difference lies in the values that instantiate the attributes; namely the *actor* and the *means*. In the reference corpus, the actor is instantiated as a 'jihadi/jihadist' which is further instantiated as 'fighter', 'believer', and 'prophet Muhammed'. In NOW, the 'jihadi/jihadist' actor is given the following values: 'fighter', 'terrorist', 'murderer', 'suicide bomber'.
- 4) The *means* attribute similarly features a big gap between the two corpora. In the Holy Qur'an, the values are: 'self' and 'property' (with equal frequency), and the 'Qur'an'. In NOW, no mention of 'property' or 'Qur'an' is present; but 'bombs', and 'arms' are the basic two values of the attribute *means*.

Examining these findings in the light of Dijk's model of manipulation, the researcher highlights how the semantic difference can be seen as an instance of manipulative discourse. First and foremost, with respect to the social axis of triangulated manipulation, NOW represents a type of discourse that typically Dijk defines as an instance of 'social manipulation' where "domination...requires special access to, or control over, scarce social resources. One of these resources is preferential access to the mass media and public discourse, a resource shared by members of 'symbolic' elites, such as politicians, journalists, scholars, writers, teachers, and so on" (Van Dijk, 1996, p.). NOW is a compiled corpus of news on the web; hence it involves two types of 'scarce social resources' access: first, access to the web, and second access to media discourse. Using Dijk's terms, social conditions of manipulative control are present: writers of articles, reporters and commentators assume the position of 'social domination' and 'reproduce' such form of power via public discourse. As will be elaborated on with the manipulative strategies below, providing "insufficient or otherwise biased information" is considered an instance of manipulation of the 'clients' of media discourse, *viz a vis*, the readers.

The second axis of manipulative discourse as per Dijk's model involves cognitive manipulation. As elaborated beforehand in the Theoretical Framework section, cognitive manipulation involves manipulating both short-term and long-term memory. As pointed by Dijk, "[I]n episodic memory, the understanding of situated text and talk is thus related to more complete models of experiences. Understanding is not merely associating meanings to words, sentences or discourses, but constructing mental models in episodic memory" (2006, p.367). This is basically done via using particular discourse strategies that 'gear' the recipients' mental representations of concepts, events, and people towards those of their 'manipulators'. Here is where the 'manipulation' of the *attributes* and their co-occurring *values* of *JIHAD* feature as an instance of cognitive manipulation.

Finally, the third axis involves discursive manipulation which targets "the control of the shared social representations of groups of people because these social beliefs in turn control what people do and say in many situations and over a relatively long period" (Dijk, 2006, p.396). This is the final stage of manipulation via discourse, where the ideologies of the manipulator discursively combine 'cognitive and social dimensions'. This is realized via the stress on the criminal-like aspects of jihadists, which in turn manipulates the social cognition of readers, and hence their attitudes.

Following is an analysis of the main discourse strategies of manipulation that correspond to the semantic difference of *JIHAD* in the Holy Qur'an and NOW:

1. Generalization: Dijk sees this strategy as a means by which "a concrete specific example that has made an impact on people's mental models, is

generalized to more general knowledge or attitudes, or even fundamental ideologies” (2006, p.370). This is the case with all instances of NOW where a jihad-related event is covered. These news coverages mostly relate to specific incidents/attacks. However, the way the news discourse deals with these incidents changes the reaction of the concerned parties into general knowledge and attitudes.

2. Incomplete or lack of relevant knowledge: this is particularly of importance, as per Dijk's model, “so that no counter-arguments can be formulated against false, incomplete or biased assertions” where the representation of the jihadist as per the reference corpus, Holy Qur'an, is filtered and zoomed in to focus on particular features, particularly ‘fighting’ and ‘warring’, rather than the other positive attributes. This is typical of manipulative discourse which intends “drawing attention to information A rather than B, the resulting understanding may be partial or biased” (Dijk, 2006, p. 366). This could be taken as an instance of STM manipulation.
3. Changing social representation by forming script-like structures of unfavoured people or groups: Dijk himself cites attitudes about terrorists, their ‘prototypical attributes’ and ‘violent means’ as an instance of this strategy. He adds that “[S]uch attitudes are gradually acquired by generalization and abstraction from mental models formed by specific news stories” (p.371). A clear instance of episodic (or LTM manipulation), this is typically realized in NOW and validated by examining the collocating adjectives, verbs and nouns with all derivatives of *JIHAD* and represented in the semantic frame of the concept in the values of the *attributes* of ‘means’. A negative representation of jihadists is done throughout media discourse; backgrounding any possible positive attributes that the term has in religious discourse.
4. Topic selection: where Dijk highlights the importance of “(de) emphasizing negative/positive topics about Us/Them” (p.372). All jihad-related news stories involve killing, suicide bombing and terrorist attacks, which could be taken as an instance of STM manipulation. No articles or even news reports care to introduce the other ‘de-emphasized’ meaning of *JIHAD* even as a sort of informative media discourse.

On a micro-level, the following discourse strategies are used:

5. Lexicon: where ‘negative’ words for ‘Them’ are used. In the NOW-based semantic frame of *JIHAD*, the *values* emphasized for the *attribute* jihadi are ‘terrorist’, ‘murderer’, ‘suicide bomber’ among other criminal-like images, rather than a ‘worshipper’ or ‘believer’. Similarly, the emphasized *values* for the *attribute* means are: ‘weapon’, ‘gun’, ‘bomb’, rather than ‘money’ or ‘Qur'an’. This manipulative discourse strategy is

directly relevant to the following one; namely 'incomplete or lack of relevant knowledge'.

6. Using vague expressions, implicitness, euphemism, etc. to make sure that the 'biases', 'misguided' or 'partial' knowledge is acquired. This is instantiated via examining the collocating words with JIHAD and its four derivatives. 'Radicalism', 'extremism', as well as 'terrorism' are very frequent collocates which imply a semantic equivalence with *JIHAD*.

Considering the magnitude of the examined NOW as a multi-million corpus, and examining the frequency results of JIHAD in the light of Dijk's model of manipulation, it can be concluded that the deviation in the use of the concept in NOW in comparison to the reference corpus is seen as an instance of manipulation, ideologically-driven manipulation on the part of news discourse.

الملخص

الإطار الدلالي لمفهوم "الجهاد" في القرآن الكريم و متون إلكترونية مختارة :
دراسة مقارنة في التحليل النقدي للخطاب
نهال ناجي عبد اللطيف أبو النجا

يهدف البحث الى وضع إطار دلالي لمفهوم الجهاد كما تم تصويره في القرآن الكريم في مقابل متون إلكترونية مختارة (ناو) بحيث تمثل الخطاب الإعلامي الإلكتروني في الفترة من عام 2010 إلى عام ٢٠١٦. وينخذ البحث من نظرية الإطار الدلالي لبارسالو (١٩٩٢ب) إطاراً نظرياً للبحث حيث يبدأ الباحث بتكوين إطارين دلاليين لمفهوم الجهاد في القرآن الكريم في مقابل المتن الإلكتروني المختار. ويرى بارسالو أن "الإطار (الدلالي) يُعد التمثيل الأساسي للمعرفة في الإدراك" (بارسالو، ص.٢١). ويتكون الإطار الدلالي من مجموع الصفات والقيم التي تمثل تلك الصفات. ومن هنا فإن الباحث يقوم بدراسة هذين الإطارين للوقوف على أهم ملامح الاختلاف بينهما وقد توصل في ذلك إلى وجود اختلافات أساسية في القيمة المُمثلة لأغلب الصفات المُكونة للإطار الدلالي لمفهوم الجهاد في الخطاب الإعلامي الإلكتروني عن نظيره المُستمد من القرآن الكريم ومن خلال تحليل الإطار القائم على المتن الإلكتروني في ضوء نظرية فان دايك (٢٠٠٦) للخطاب والتحليل الثلاثي، توصل الباحث إلى أن هذا الاختلاف هو اختلاف نابع من توجهات أيديولوجية لكاتب الخطاب الإعلامي.

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| Verse | Process | Participant | | Circumstance | |
|---|-----------------------------|--|-------|--------------|---------------------|
| | | Actor | Goal | Manner | Purpose |
| Surah 2. Al-Baqara 218. Lo! those who believe, and those who emigrate (to escape the persecution) and strive (jahadu/did <i>JIHAD</i>) in the way of Allah, these have hope of Allah's mercy. Allah is Forgiving, Merciful. | Did <i>JIHAD</i> jahadu | Those who believe/ those who emigrate | _____ | _____ | In the way of Allah |
| Surah 3. Al-Imran: Or deemed ye that ye would enter Paradise while yet Allah knoweth not those of you who really strive (jahadu (did <i>JIHAD</i>), nor knoweth those (of you) who are steadfast? | Jahadu/ <i>JIHAD</i> did | Those of you | _____ | _____ | _____ |
| Surah 4. An-Nisaa | | | | | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|--|---|-----------------------------|
| 95. Those of the believers who sit still, other than those who have a (disabling) hurt, are not on an equality with those who strive (al-mujahiduna/ doers of <i>JIHAD</i>) in the way of Allah with their wealth and lives. Allah hath conferred on those who strive (al-mujahiduna/ doers of <i>JIHAD</i>) with their wealth and lives a rank above the sedentary. Unto each Allah hath promised good, but He hath bestowed on those who strive (al-mujahiduna/ doers of <i>JIHAD</i>) a great reward above the sedentary; | Al-mujahidun/doers of <i>JIHAD</i> al-mujahidina/ doers of <i>JIHAD</i> al-mujahidin/ doers of <i>JIHAD</i> | Those who Those who Those who | | their wealth and lives their wealth and lives. | In the way of Allah |
| Surah 5. Al-Maidah 35. O ye who believe! Be mindful of your duty to Allah, and seek the way of approach unto Him, and strive (jahidu/ do <i>JIHAD</i>) in His way in order that ye may succeed. | jahidu/ do <i>JIHAD</i> | Ye who believe | | | the way of Allah |
| Surah 5. Al-Maidah 54. O ye who believe! Whoso of you becometh a renegade from his religion, (know that in his stead) Allah will bring a people whom He loveth and who love Him, humble toward believers, stern toward disbelievers, striving (yujahiduna/ do <i>JIHAD</i>) in the way of Allah and fearing not the blame of any blamer.... | yujahidun/ do <i>JIHAD</i> | ye who believe | | | The way of Allah |
| Surah 8. Al-Anfal 72. Lo! those who believed and left their homes and strove (jahadu/ did <i>JIHAD</i>) with their wealth and their lives for the cause of Allah, and those who took them in and helped them; these are protecting friends one of another.... | jahadu/ did <i>JIHAD</i> | those who believed | | with their wealth and their lives | The cause (way) of Allah |
| Surah 8. Al-Anfal 74. Those who believed and left their homes and strove (jahadu/ did <i>JIHAD</i>) for the cause of Allah, and those who took them in and helped them these are the believers in truth. For them is pardon, and a bountiful provision. | jahadu/ did <i>JIHAD</i> | Those who believed | | | The cause (way) of Allah |
| Surah 8. Al-Anfal 75. And those who afterwards believed and left their homes and strove (jahadu/ did <i>JIHAD</i>) along with you, they are of you; | jahadu/ did <i>JIHAD</i> | Those who believed | | | |

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| | | | | | |
|--|--------------------------------|-------|-------------------------|-----------------------------------|---|
| and those who are akin are nearer one to another in the ordinance of Allah.... | | | | | |
| Surah 9. At-Tauba 16. Or deemed ye that ye would be left (in peace) when Allah yet knoweth not those of you who strive (jahadu/ did <i>JIHAD</i>), choosing for familiar none save Allah and His messenger and the believers? | jahadu/ <i>JIHAD</i> | did | Those of you | _____ | _____ |
| Surah 9. At-Tauba 19. Count ye the slaking of a pilgrim's thirst and tendance of the Inviolable Place of Worship as (equal to the worth of him) who believeth in Allah and the Last Day, and striveth (<i>JIHAD</i> / doing <i>JIHAD</i>) in the way of Allah? They are not equal in the sight of Allah. Allah guideth not wrongdoing folk. | <i>JIHAD</i> / <i>JIHAD</i> | doing | who believe in Allah | _____ | _____ |
| 20. Those who believe, and have left their homes and striven (jahadu/ did <i>JIHAD</i>) with their wealth and their lives in Allah's way are of much greater worth in Allah's sight. These are they who are triumphant. | jahadu/ <i>JIHAD</i> | did | Those who believe | _____ | with their wealth and their lives |
| 24. Say: If your fathers, and your sons, and your brethren... are dearer to you than Allah and His messenger and striving (<i>JIHAD</i> / doing <i>JIHAD</i>) in His way: then wait till Allah bringeth His command to pass. Allah guideth not wrong doing folk. | <i>JIHAD</i> / <i>JIHAD</i> | doing | | _____ | _____ |
| 41. Go forth, light armed and heavy armed, and strive (jahidu/ do <i>JIHAD</i>) with your wealth and your lives in the way of Allah! That is best for you if ye but knew. | jahidu/ <i>JIHAD</i> | do | | _____ | with your wealth and your lives |
| 44. Those who believe in Allah and the Last Day ask no leave of thee lest they should strive (yujahidu/ to do <i>JIHAD</i>) with their wealth and their lives. Allah is Aware of those who keep their duty (unto Him). | yujahidu/ <i>JIHAD</i> | to do | Those who believe | _____ | with their wealth and their lives. |
| 73. O Prophet! Strive (jahid/ do <i>JIHAD</i>) against the disbelievers and the hypocrites! Be harsh with them. Their ultimate abode is hell, a hapless journey's end. | jahid/ do <i>JIHAD</i> | | prophet | Disbelievers And hypocrites | _____ |

| | | | | | |
|--|--|-------------------------------------|--------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| 81. Those who were left behind rejoiced at sitting still behind the messenger of Allah, and were averse to striving (yujahidu/ to do <i>JIHAD</i>) with their wealth and their lives in Allah's way.... | yujahidu/ to do <i>JIHAD</i> | Those who were left behind | _____ | with their wealth and their lives | in Allah's way. |
| 86. And when a surah is revealed (which saith): Believe in Allah and strive (jahidu/ do <i>JIHAD</i>) along with His messenger, the men of wealth among them still ask leave of thee and say: Suffer us to be with those who sit (at home). | jahidu/ do <i>JIHAD</i> | the men of wealth among them | _____ | _____ | _____ |
| 88. But the messenger and those who believe with him strive (jahadu/ did <i>JIHAD</i>) with their wealth and their lives. Such are they for whom are the good things. Such are they who are the successful. | jahadu/ did <i>JIHAD</i> | the messenger and those who believe | _____ | with their wealth and their lives | _____ |
| Surah 22. Al-Hajj 78. And strive (jahidu/ do <i>JIHAD</i>) for Allah with the endeavour which is His right. He hath chosen you and hath not laid upon you in religion any hardship; the faith of your father Abraham (is yours).... | jahidu/ do <i>JIHAD</i> | ye who believe | _____ | _____ | _____ |
| Surah 25. Al-Furqan 52. So obey not the disbelievers, but strive (jahiduhum/ do <i>JIHAD</i>) against them herewith with a great endeavour. | jahiduhum/ do <i>JIHAD</i> | Prophet Muhammad | disbelievers | Qur'an | _____ |
| Surah 29. Al-Ankabut 6. And whosoever striveth (jahada/ does <i>JIHAD</i>), striveth (yujahidu/ does <i>JIHAD</i>) only for himself, for lo! Allah is altogether Independent of (His) creatures | jahada/ does <i>JIHAD</i> yujahidu/ does <i>JIHAD</i> | He who | _____ | _____ | For himself |
| 69. As for those who strive (jahadu/ did <i>JIHAD</i>) in Us, We surely guide them to Our paths, and lo! Allah is with the good. | jahadu/ did <i>JIHAD</i> | those who | _____ | _____ | in Us (in the way of Allah) |
| Surah 47. Muhammad 31. And verily We shall try you till We know those of you who strive (al-mujahidina/ the doers of <i>JIHAD</i>) hard (for the cause of Allah) and the steadfast, and till We test your record. | al-mujahidina/ the doers of <i>JIHAD</i> | Those who | _____ | _____ | _____ |
| Surah 49. Al-Hujurat 15. The (true) believers are those only who believe in Allah and His messenger and afterward doubt not, but strive | jahadu/ did <i>JIHAD</i> | The true believers | _____ | with their wealth | for the cause of |

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| | | | | | |
|---|-------------------------------------|------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------------------|--|
| (jahadu/ did <i>JIHAD</i>) with their wealth and their lives for the cause of Allah. Such are the sincere. | | | | and their lives | Allah |
| Surah60.AIMumtahana 1. O ye who believe! Choose not My enemy and your enemy for friends...If ye have come forth to strive (<i>JIHAD</i> an/ doing <i>JIHAD</i>) in My way and seeking My good pleasure, (show them not friendship).... | <i>JIHAD</i> an/ doing <i>JIHAD</i> | ye who believe | | | in My way and seeking My good pleasure |
| Surah 66. At-Tahrim 9. O Prophet! Strive (jahid/ do <i>JIHAD</i>) against the disbelievers and the hypocrites, and be stern with them. Hell will be their home, a hapless journey's end | jahid/ do <i>JIHAD</i> | Prophet Muhammad | Disbelievers and hypocrites | | |
| Surah 61. As-Saff 11. Ye should believe in Allah and His messenger, and should strive (tujahiduna/ do <i>JIHAD</i>) for the cause of Allah with your wealth and your lives.... | (tujahiduna/ do <i>JIHAD</i> | ye who believe | | with your wealth and your lives. | for the cause of Allah |

Appendix 2

1. Collocates of 'jihad'



NOW Corpus (News on the Web)

| SEARCH | FREQUENCY | CONTEXT | ACCOUNT |
|--------|-------------|---------|---------|
| 17 | ARMED | 191 | 286487 |
| 18 | MUSLIMS | 186 | 216973 |
| 19 | AFGHANISTAN | 176 | 217684 |
| 20 | AL | 157 | 211759 |
| 21 | MILITANT | 145 | 74478 |
| 22 | ISIS | 138 | 137287 |
| 23 | IRAQ | 137 | 220902 |
| 24 | KASHMIR | 132 | 219588 |
| 25 | PALESTINIAN | 125 | 73315 |
| 26 | CONCEPT | 124 | 248300 |
| 27 | MUSUM | 118 | 320986 |
| 28 | TERRORISM | 116 | 224901 |
| 29 | FIGHTING | 113 | 367107 |
| 30 | STRUGGLE | 112 | 239901 |
| 31 | ABU | 106 | 92331 |
| 32 | RELIGIOUS | 100 | 356708 |
| 33 | EGYPTIAN | 86 | 55870 |

NOW Corpus (News on the Web)

| SEARCH | FREQUENCY | CONTEXT | ACCOUNT |
|--------|-------------|---------|---------|
| 35 | ONENESS | 83 | 3150 |
| 36 | SYRIAN | 83 | 179922 |
| 37 | MARTYRDOM | 82 | 7723 |
| 38 | MEANING | 79 | 268760 |
| 39 | JANE | 77 | 84902 |
| 40 | SO-CALLED | 77 | 164563 |
| 41 | DECLARED | 77 | 277374 |
| 42 | IDEOLOGY | 76 | 56444 |
| 43 | TERRORIST | 76 | 192866 |
| 44 | ISRAEL | 74 | 244514 |
| 45 | WAL | 72 | 1856 |
| 46 | RADICAL | 72 | 101632 |
| 47 | FIGHTERS | 69 | 138686 |
| 48 | WAGED | 68 | 12587 |
| 49 | UNITY | 66 | 116598 |
| 50 | PARTICIPATE | 66 | 166931 |
| 51 | BANGLADESH | 64 | 218404 |

NOW Corpus (News on the Web)

| SEARCH | FREQUENCY | CONTEXT | ACCOUNT |
|--------|-------------|---------|---------|
| 52 | SOVIET | 63 | 69017 |
| 53 | TERROR | 63 | 186351 |
| 54 | JOINING | 62 | 181692 |
| 55 | GHAR | 61 | 4961 |
| 56 | AL-QAEDA | 57 | 32330 |
| 57 | TERRORISTS | 57 | 164000 |
| 58 | UJC | 55 | 332 |
| 59 | ISLAMIST | 55 | 50266 |
| 60 | TAWHID | 54 | 358 |
| 61 | ALLAH | 53 | 40986 |
| 62 | ENGAGE | 53 | 192437 |
| 63 | SAKE | 52 | 72024 |
| 64 | ANTI-SOVIET | 51 | 499 |
| 65 | VERSES | 47 | 14666 |
| 66 | MILITANTS | 47 | 134014 |
| 67 | QAEDA | 46 | 26004 |
| 68 | SHARIA | 45 | 15856 |
| 69 | TALIBAN | 45 | 88215 |

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| SEARCH | FREQUENCY | CONTEXT | ACCOUNT | | |
|--------|------------|---------|---------|-------|-------|
| 70 | SUNNAH | 44 | 1655 | 2.66 | 9.63 |
| 71 | PROPHET | 44 | 41776 | 0.11 | 4.97 |
| 72 | INFIDELS | 42 | 3152 | 1.33 | 8.63 |
| 73 | MAKDISSI | 41 | 112 | 36.61 | 13.41 |
| 74 | STEALTH | 41 | 16141 | 0.25 | 6.24 |
| 75 | TEACHINGS | 41 | 22977 | 0.18 | 5.73 |
| 76 | DECLARE | 40 | 70070 | 0.06 | 4.08 |
| 77 | HEZBOLLAH | 39 | 15942 | 0.24 | 6.18 |
| 78 | PROMOTING | 39 | 142682 | 0.03 | 3.02 |
| 79 | WAPSI | 38 | 865 | 4.39 | 10.35 |
| 80 | BIN | 38 | 87723 | 0.04 | 3.69 |
| 81 | ARABIC | 37 | 30279 | 0.12 | 5.18 |
| 82 | HARKATUL | 36 | 125 | 28.80 | 13.06 |
| 83 | PREACHING | 36 | 15135 | 0.24 | 6.14 |
| 84 | LADEN | 36 | 38731 | 0.09 | 4.79 |
| 85 | 1980S | 36 | 66773 | 0.05 | 4.00 |
| 86 | CALIPHATE | 35 | 14593 | 0.24 | 6.16 |
| 87 | CONDEMN | 34 | 36948 | 0.09 | 4.77 |
| 88 | JEWS | 34 | 79483 | 0.04 | 3.67 |
| 89 | HARKAT-UL | 33 | 88 | 37.50 | 13.44 |
| 90 | GAZA | 32 | 44914 | 0.07 | 4.40 |
| 91 | PROPAGANDA | 32 | 63565 | 0.05 | 3.90 |
| 92 | DIB | 31 | 659 | 4.70 | 10.45 |
| 93 | CONQUEST | 31 | 10398 | 0.30 | 6.47 |
| 94 | YOUTHIS | 31 | 110386 | 0.03 | 3.06 |
| 95 | DIYAB | 30 | 134 | 22.39 | 12.70 |
| 96 | UMM | 30 | 3706 | 0.81 | 7.91 |
| 97 | DOCTRINE | 30 | 27204 | 0.11 | 5.03 |
| 98 | EXTREMISTS | 29 | 39438 | 0.07 | 4.45 |
| 99 | ISLAMI | 28 | 2866 | 0.98 | 8.18 |
| 100 | EXTREMIST | 28 | 42753 | 0.07 | 4.28 |

2. Collocates of jihadism

NOW Corpus (News on the Web)

SEARCH FREQUENCY CONTEXT ACCOUNT

SEE CONTEXT: CLICK ON WORD OR SELECT WORDS + [CONTEXT] [HELP...]

| | CONTEXT | FREQ | ALL | % | MI | |
|----|------------------------------------|------|---------|------|-------|--|
| 1 | <input type="checkbox"/> RADICAL | 85 | 101632 | 0.08 | 8.42 | |
| 2 | <input type="checkbox"/> VIOLENT | 60 | 192899 | 0.03 | 7.00 | |
| 3 | <input type="checkbox"/> ISLAMIC | 51 | 347368 | 0.01 | 5.91 | |
| 4 | <input type="checkbox"/> TERRORISM | 50 | 224901 | 0.02 | 6.51 | |
| 5 | <input type="checkbox"/> GLOBAL | 50 | 1336980 | 0.00 | 3.94 | |
| 6 | <input type="checkbox"/> ISLAMISM | 29 | 2600 | 1.12 | 12.16 | |
| 7 | <input type="checkbox"/> THREAT | 29 | 379263 | 0.01 | 4.97 | |
| 8 | <input type="checkbox"/> SALAFI | 26 | 1778 | 1.46 | 12.55 | |
| 9 | <input type="checkbox"/> RISE | 26 | 547284 | 0.00 | 4.28 | |
| 10 | <input type="checkbox"/> MILITANT | 22 | 74478 | 0.03 | 6.92 | |
| 11 | <input type="checkbox"/> EXPERT | 20 | 232042 | 0.01 | 5.14 | |
| 12 | <input type="checkbox"/> ISLAMIST | 19 | 50266 | 0.04 | 7.28 | |
| 13 | <input type="checkbox"/> ISLAM | 18 | 158237 | 0.01 | 5.54 | |
| 14 | <input type="checkbox"/> FIGHT | 18 | 699814 | 0.00 | 3.40 | |
| 15 | <input type="checkbox"/> WAHHABI | 17 | 1544 | 1.10 | 12.14 | |
| 16 | <input type="checkbox"/> SUNNI | 17 | 31990 | 0.05 | 7.77 | |

NOW Corpus (News on the Web)

SEARCH FREQUENCY CONTEXT ACCOUNT

SEE CONTEXT: CLICK ON WORD OR SELECT WORDS + [CONTEXT] [HELP...]

| | CONTEXT | FREQ | ALL | % | MI | |
|----|------------------------------------|------|---------|------|-------|--|
| 1 | <input type="checkbox"/> RADICAL | 85 | 101632 | 0.08 | 8.42 | |
| 2 | <input type="checkbox"/> VIOLENT | 60 | 192899 | 0.03 | 7.00 | |
| 3 | <input type="checkbox"/> ISLAMIC | 51 | 347368 | 0.01 | 5.91 | |
| 4 | <input type="checkbox"/> TERRORISM | 50 | 224901 | 0.02 | 6.51 | |
| 5 | <input type="checkbox"/> GLOBAL | 50 | 1336980 | 0.00 | 3.94 | |
| 6 | <input type="checkbox"/> ISLAMISM | 29 | 2600 | 1.12 | 12.16 | |
| 7 | <input type="checkbox"/> THREAT | 29 | 379263 | 0.01 | 4.97 | |
| 8 | <input type="checkbox"/> SALAFI | 26 | 1778 | 1.46 | 12.55 | |
| 9 | <input type="checkbox"/> RISE | 26 | 547284 | 0.00 | 4.28 | |
| 10 | <input type="checkbox"/> MILITANT | 22 | 74478 | 0.03 | 6.92 | |
| 11 | <input type="checkbox"/> EXPERT | 20 | 232042 | 0.01 | 5.14 | |
| 12 | <input type="checkbox"/> ISLAMIST | 19 | 50266 | 0.04 | 7.28 | |
| 13 | <input type="checkbox"/> ISLAM | 18 | 158237 | 0.01 | 5.54 | |
| 14 | <input type="checkbox"/> FIGHT | 18 | 699814 | 0.00 | 3.40 | |
| 15 | <input type="checkbox"/> WAHHABI | 17 | 1544 | 1.10 | 12.14 | |
| 16 | <input type="checkbox"/> SUNNI | 17 | 31990 | 0.05 | 7.77 | |

NOW Corpus (News on the Web)

SEARCH FREQUENCY CONTEXT ACCOUNT

| | CONTEXT | FREQ | ALL | % | MI | |
|----|-------------------------------------|------|--------|-------|-------|--|
| 17 | <input type="checkbox"/> EXTREMISM | 16 | 42733 | 0.04 | 7.26 | |
| 18 | <input type="checkbox"/> IDEOLOGY | 13 | 56444 | 0.02 | 6.56 | |
| 19 | <input type="checkbox"/> HOTBED | 12 | 6384 | 0.19 | 9.59 | |
| 20 | <input type="checkbox"/> COUNTER | 12 | 127892 | 0.01 | 5.27 | |
| 21 | <input type="checkbox"/> DEFEAT | 12 | 245543 | 0.00 | 4.33 | |
| 22 | <input type="checkbox"/> MODERN | 12 | 440593 | 0.00 | 3.48 | |
| 23 | <input type="checkbox"/> ISIS | 11 | 137287 | 0.01 | 5.04 | |
| 24 | <input type="checkbox"/> WESTERN | 11 | 536880 | 0.00 | 3.07 | |
| 25 | <input type="checkbox"/> AYEMEN | 10 | 86 | 11.63 | 15.54 | |
| 26 | <input type="checkbox"/> AL-TAMIMI | 10 | 228 | 4.39 | 14.14 | |
| 27 | <input type="checkbox"/> TOWARD | 10 | 258461 | 0.00 | 3.99 | |
| 28 | <input type="checkbox"/> SYRIA | 10 | 286057 | 0.00 | 3.84 | |
| 29 | <input type="checkbox"/> SALAFIST | 9 | 1535 | 0.59 | 11.23 | |
| 30 | <input type="checkbox"/> HOME-GROWN | 9 | 17237 | 0.05 | 7.74 | |
| 31 | <input type="checkbox"/> 9/11 | 9 | 30125 | 0.03 | 6.94 | |
| 32 | <input type="checkbox"/> MUSLIMS | 9 | 216973 | 0.00 | 4.09 | |
| 33 | <input type="checkbox"/> SPREAD | 9 | 320860 | 0.00 | 3.52 | |
| 34 | <input type="checkbox"/> FIGHTING | 9 | 367107 | 0.00 | 3.33 | |


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| SEARCH | FREQUENCY | CONTEXT | ACCOUNT | | |
|--------|----------------|---------|---------|------|-------|
| 53 | PROMOTE | 6 | 267398 | 0.00 | 3.20 |
| 54 | SALAFISM | 5 | 618 | 0.81 | 11.70 |
| 55 | SECTARIANISM | 5 | 4139 | 0.12 | 8.95 |
| 56 | FUNDAMENTALISM | 5 | 5404 | 0.09 | 8.57 |
| 57 | DEFEATING | 5 | 30206 | 0.02 | 6.09 |
| 58 | AL-QAEDA | 5 | 32330 | 0.02 | 5.99 |
| 59 | THREATENS | 5 | 37360 | 0.01 | 5.78 |
| 60 | RAMPANT | 5 | 40748 | 0.01 | 5.65 |
| 61 | POSES | 5 | 63983 | 0.01 | 5.00 |
| 62 | NETHERLANDS | 5 | 83287 | 0.01 | 4.62 |
| 63 | PHENOMENON | 5 | 88472 | 0.01 | 4.54 |
| 64 | EMBRACE | 5 | 94634 | 0.01 | 4.44 |
| 65 | HARPER | 5 | 96632 | 0.01 | 4.41 |
| 66 | DUTCH | 5 | 97378 | 0.01 | 4.40 |
| 67 | REFERENCE | 5 | 160364 | 0.00 | 3.68 |
| 68 | TACKLE | 5 | 161994 | 0.00 | 3.66 |
| 69 | LOSSES | 5 | 213072 | 0.00 | 3.27 |

| SEARCH | FREQUENCY | CONTEXT | ACCOUNT | | |
|--------|----------------|---------|---------|------|-------|
| 71 | EPICENTRE | 4 | 8881 | 0.05 | 7.53 |
| 72 | STRIKE | 4 | 11871 | 0.03 | 7.11 |
| 73 | MANIFESTATION | 4 | 13152 | 0.03 | 6.96 |
| 74 | JIHAD | 4 | 20732 | 0.02 | 6.31 |
| 75 | CLEARING | 4 | 60518 | 0.01 | 4.76 |
| 76 | SPREADING | 4 | 72089 | 0.01 | 4.51 |
| 77 | EVOLUTION | 4 | 99854 | 0.00 | 4.04 |
| 78 | ETHNIC | 4 | 115376 | 0.00 | 3.83 |
| 79 | FUNDAMENTAL | 4 | 137736 | 0.00 | 3.57 |
| 80 | WIDER | 4 | 145706 | 0.00 | 3.49 |
| 81 | CONVICTED | 4 | 170948 | 0.00 | 3.26 |
| 82 | OPPOSED | 4 | 173855 | 0.00 | 3.24 |
| 83 | PAKISTANI | 4 | 177459 | 0.00 | 3.21 |
| 84 | TERRORIST | 4 | 199864 | 0.00 | 3.04 |
| 85 | ISLAMO-FASCISM | 3 | 41 | 7.32 | 14.87 |
| 86 | AMARASINGAM | 3 | 222 | 1.35 | 12.44 |
| 87 | MOROCCANS | 3 | 1504 | 0.20 | 9.68 |
| 88 | NIHILISTIC | 3 | 1633 | 0.18 | 9.56 |

| SEARCH | FREQUENCY | CONTEXT | ACCOUNT | | |
|--------|-----------------|---------|---------|------|-------|
| 86 | AMARASINGAM | 3 | 222 | 1.35 | 12.44 |
| 87 | MOROCCANS | 3 | 1504 | 0.20 | 9.68 |
| 88 | NIHILISTIC | 3 | 1633 | 0.18 | 9.56 |
| 89 | RADICALISM | 3 | 5236 | 0.06 | 7.88 |
| 90 | MODERNITY | 3 | 9475 | 0.03 | 7.02 |
| 91 | HOME-GROWN | 3 | 10885 | 0.03 | 6.82 |
| 92 | SELF-PROCLAIMED | 3 | 12071 | 0.02 | 6.67 |
| 93 | MINORITIES | 3 | 13342 | 0.02 | 6.54 |
| 94 | CLEANSING | 3 | 15503 | 0.02 | 6.31 |
| 95 | SHARIA | 3 | 15856 | 0.02 | 6.28 |
| 96 | JIHADISTS | 3 | 21615 | 0.01 | 5.83 |
| 97 | DOCTRINE | 3 | 27204 | 0.01 | 5.50 |
| 98 | MALI | 3 | 30326 | 0.01 | 5.34 |
| 99 | EMERGENCE | 3 | 42882 | 0.01 | 4.84 |
| 100 | BELGIAN | 3 | 47426 | 0.01 | 4.70 |
| TOTAL | | 1045 | | | |

3. Collocates of jihadist



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| SEARCH | FREQUENCY | CONTEXT | ACCOUNT | |
|--------|-----------|---------|---------|------|
| 50 | 107 | 174041 | 5.08 | 4.62 |
| 51 | 97 | 179922 | 0.05 | 3.99 |
| 52 | 95 | 237890 | 0.04 | 3.56 |
| 53 | 93 | 206607 | 0.05 | 3.73 |
| 54 | 91 | 192899 | 0.05 | 3.80 |
| 55 | 90 | 262313 | 0.03 | 3.34 |
| 56 | 86 | 35173 | 0.24 | 6.17 |
| 57 | 86 | 50266 | 0.17 | 5.66 |
| 58 | 85 | 92331 | 0.09 | 4.76 |
| 59 | 83 | 42733 | 0.19 | 5.84 |
| 60 | 81 | 27718 | 0.21 | 5.98 |
| 61 | 76 | 82060 | 0.09 | 4.77 |
| 62 | 76 | 112060 | 0.07 | 4.52 |
| 63 | 73 | 91201 | 0.08 | 4.56 |
| 64 | 69 | 38047 | 0.18 | 5.74 |
| 65 | 69 | 239103 | 0.03 | 3.09 |
| 66 | 66 | 133615 | 0.05 | 3.86 |
| 67 | 65 | 21435 | 0.30 | 6.48 |

| SEARCH | FREQUENCY | CONTEXT | ACCOUNT | |
|--------|-----------|---------|---------|------|
| 68 | 65 | 42753 | 0.15 | 5.49 |
| 69 | 63 | 3147 | 2.00 | 9.20 |
| 70 | 63 | 10878 | 0.58 | 7.42 |
| 71 | 63 | 24309 | 0.26 | 6.25 |
| 72 | 62 | 39438 | 0.16 | 5.53 |
| 73 | 62 | 224863 | 0.03 | 3.02 |
| 74 | 61 | 75794 | 0.08 | 4.57 |
| 75 | 61 | 204550 | 0.03 | 3.14 |
| 76 | 60 | 30829 | 0.19 | 5.84 |
| 77 | 60 | 75390 | 0.08 | 4.55 |
| 78 | 58 | 153278 | 0.04 | 3.48 |
| 79 | 57 | 26004 | 0.22 | 6.01 |
| 80 | 57 | 15026 | 0.16 | 5.58 |
| 81 | 54 | 1778 | 3.04 | 9.81 |
| 82 | 53 | 31863 | 0.17 | 5.62 |
| 83 | 53 | 129767 | 0.04 | 3.59 |
| 84 | 52 | 89517 | 0.06 | 4.10 |
| 85 | 52 | 163320 | 0.03 | 3.23 |

| SEARCH | FREQUENCY | CONTEXT | ACCOUNT | |
|--------|-----------|---------|---------|------|
| 84 | 52 | 89517 | 0.06 | 4.10 |
| 85 | 52 | 163320 | 0.03 | 3.23 |
| 86 | 52 | 181701 | 0.03 | 3.08 |
| 87 | 51 | 5526 | 0.92 | 8.09 |
| 88 | 50 | 30326 | 0.16 | 5.60 |
| 89 | 49 | 1535 | 3.19 | 9.88 |
| 90 | 49 | 45478 | 0.11 | 4.99 |
| 91 | 49 | 156849 | 0.03 | 3.20 |
| 92 | 46 | 165542 | 0.03 | 3.03 |
| 93 | 45 | 158237 | 0.03 | 3.07 |
| 94 | 43 | 4326 | 0.99 | 8.19 |
| 95 | 41 | 34571 | 0.12 | 5.13 |
| 96 | 41 | 43477 | 0.09 | 4.80 |
| 97 | 41 | 122330 | 0.03 | 3.31 |
| 98 | 40 | 5561 | 0.72 | 7.73 |
| 99 | 40 | 59127 | 0.07 | 4.32 |
| 100 | 40 | 65713 | 0.06 | 4.16 |
| TOTAL | 23697 | | | |

4. Collocates of 'jihadi'

SEARCH: CONTEXT

| | | FREQ | ALL | % | MI |
|----|-------------------------------------|------|---------|------|-------|
| 1 | <input type="checkbox"/> JOIN | 1400 | 105932 | 0.14 | 6.21 |
| 2 | <input type="checkbox"/> GROUPS | 837 | 701261 | 0.12 | 6.01 |
| 3 | <input type="checkbox"/> GROUP | 550 | 2598543 | 0.02 | 3.51 |
| 4 | <input type="checkbox"/> KNOWN | 368 | 1160076 | 0.03 | 4.10 |
| 5 | <input type="checkbox"/> FIGHTERS | 269 | 138686 | 0.19 | 6.71 |
| 6 | <input type="checkbox"/> BRIDES | 250 | 11173 | 2.24 | 10.24 |
| 7 | <input type="checkbox"/> TERRORISM | 238 | 224901 | 0.11 | 5.84 |
| 8 | <input type="checkbox"/> SYRIA | 234 | 286057 | 0.08 | 5.46 |
| 9 | <input type="checkbox"/> ISIS | 224 | 137287 | 0.16 | 6.46 |
| 10 | <input type="checkbox"/> BRITISH | 189 | 821199 | 0.02 | 3.63 |
| 11 | <input type="checkbox"/> ISLAMIC | 183 | 347368 | 0.05 | 4.83 |
| 12 | <input type="checkbox"/> TERRORISTS | 160 | 164000 | 0.10 | 5.72 |
| 13 | <input type="checkbox"/> BRIDE | 154 | 38021 | 0.41 | 7.77 |
| 14 | <input type="checkbox"/> TERROR | 136 | 186351 | 0.07 | 5.33 |
| 15 | <input type="checkbox"/> TERRORIST | 136 | 199894 | 0.07 | 5.22 |

SEARCH: CONTEXT

| | | FREQ | ALL | % | MI |
|----|--|------|--------|------|-------|
| 16 | <input type="checkbox"/> ATTACKS | 131 | 805730 | 0.02 | 3.13 |
| 17 | <input type="checkbox"/> MILITANT | 130 | 74478 | 0.17 | 6.56 |
| 18 | <input type="checkbox"/> EXECUTIONER | 122 | 3346 | 3.65 | 10.94 |
| 19 | <input type="checkbox"/> EMWAZI | 115 | 1401 | 8.21 | 12.11 |
| 20 | <input type="checkbox"/> DUBBED | 111 | 77831 | 0.14 | 6.27 |
| 21 | <input type="checkbox"/> MOVEMENT | 111 | 466262 | 0.02 | 3.68 |
| 22 | <input type="checkbox"/> OUTFITS | 105 | 43177 | 0.24 | 7.03 |
| 23 | <input type="checkbox"/> IDEOLOGY | 103 | 56444 | 0.18 | 6.62 |
| 24 | <input type="checkbox"/> THREAT | 103 | 379263 | 0.03 | 3.87 |
| 25 | <input type="checkbox"/> ELEMENTS | 102 | 20400 | 0.05 | 4.75 |
| 26 | <input type="checkbox"/> ORGANISATIONS | 99 | 239103 | 0.04 | 4.48 |
| 27 | <input type="checkbox"/> MILITANTS | 97 | 134014 | 0.07 | 5.29 |
| 28 | <input type="checkbox"/> WEBSTES | 85 | 255714 | 0.03 | 4.17 |
| 29 | <input type="checkbox"/> RECRUITMENT | 80 | 91291 | 0.09 | 5.56 |
| 30 | <input type="checkbox"/> FIGHTING | 78 | 367107 | 0.02 | 3.52 |
| 31 | <input type="checkbox"/> PROPAGANDA | 76 | 63665 | 0.12 | 6.01 |
| 32 | <input type="checkbox"/> MOHAMMED | 71 | 97033 | 0.07 | 5.30 |
| 33 | <input type="checkbox"/> SUSPECTS | 67 | 183497 | 0.04 | 4.30 |

SEARCH: CONTEXT

| | | FREQ | ALL | % | MI |
|----|--------------------------------------|------|--------|------|------|
| 52 | <input type="checkbox"/> NICKNAMED | 44 | 20432 | 0.22 | 6.86 |
| 53 | <input type="checkbox"/> JACK | 44 | 209503 | 0.02 | 3.50 |
| 54 | <input type="checkbox"/> EXTREMIST | 42 | 42753 | 0.10 | 5.73 |
| 55 | <input type="checkbox"/> PAKISTANI | 42 | 177459 | 0.02 | 3.68 |
| 56 | <input type="checkbox"/> LINKS | 42 | 262313 | 0.02 | 3.11 |
| 57 | <input type="checkbox"/> KILLER | 40 | 102621 | 0.04 | 4.39 |
| 58 | <input type="checkbox"/> AFGHANISTAN | 40 | 217684 | 0.02 | 3.31 |
| 59 | <input type="checkbox"/> ISLAMIST | 39 | 50266 | 0.08 | 5.39 |
| 60 | <input type="checkbox"/> CELL | 37 | 206607 | 0.02 | 3.27 |
| 61 | <input type="checkbox"/> JIHADI | 36 | 11428 | 0.32 | 7.41 |
| 62 | <input type="checkbox"/> MASKED | 36 | 17928 | 0.20 | 6.76 |
| 63 | <input type="checkbox"/> AL-QAEDA | 36 | 32330 | 0.11 | 5.91 |
| 64 | <input type="checkbox"/> SYRIAN | 36 | 179922 | 0.02 | 3.43 |
| 65 | <input type="checkbox"/> AL | 35 | 211759 | 0.02 | 3.16 |
| 66 | <input type="checkbox"/> BANGLADESH | 34 | 218404 | 0.02 | 3.07 |
| 67 | <input type="checkbox"/> ISIL | 32 | 24309 | 0.13 | 6.15 |
| 68 | <input type="checkbox"/> NARRATIVE | 32 | 116797 | 0.08 | 3.00 |

The *JIHAD* Frame in Holy Qur'an and NOW: A Contrastive Critical Discourse Analytic Study
 Nihal Nagi Abdellatif Abu el Naga

| SEARCH | FREQUENCY | CONTEXT | ACCOUNT |
|--------|------------|---------|---------|
| 70 | EXTREMISM | 30 | 42733 |
| 71 | NASHEEDS | 28 | 118 |
| 72 | JABHAT | 27 | 3147 |
| 73 | AL-NUSRA | 27 | 5200 |
| 74 | REBELS | 27 | 108027 |
| 75 | BELGIAN | 26 | 47426 |
| 76 | CAMPUS | 26 | 104305 |
| 77 | SECTARIAN | 25 | 23485 |
| 78 | RECRUITS | 25 | 31485 |
| 79 | FACTIONS | 24 | 30829 |
| 80 | GUNMEN | 23 | 37718 |
| 81 | MINDSET | 23 | 56212 |
| 82 | TALIBAN | 23 | 88215 |
| 83 | BEHEADED | 20 | 8597 |
| 84 | RECRUITERS | 20 | 10884 |
| 85 | MILITIAS | 20 | 16632 |
| 86 | BRUTAL | 20 | 85096 |
| 87 | OUTFIT | 20 | 94442 |

| SEARCH | FREQUENCY | CONTEXT | ACCOUNT |
|--------|------------|---------|---------|
| 86 | BRUTAL | 20 | 85096 |
| 87 | OUTFIT | 20 | 94442 |
| 88 | BEHEADING | 19 | 7299 |
| 89 | AKA | 19 | 47244 |
| 90 | RECRUITING | 19 | 48649 |
| 91 | LIBYA | 19 | 82060 |
| 92 | SALAFIST | 18 | 1535 |
| 93 | RECRUITER | 18 | 7081 |
| 94 | SID | 18 | 10999 |
| 95 | UNMASKED | 17 | 2500 |
| 96 | AL-QAIDA | 17 | 9629 |
| 97 | QAEDA | 17 | 26004 |
| 98 | CIRCLES | 17 | 56798 |
| 99 | HARAM | 17 | 83451 |
| 100 | JANE | 17 | 84902 |
| TOTAL | 9458 | | |