موقف ابن رشد من مسألة علم الله بالکليات دون الجزئيات

This research talks about Ibn Rushd’s position on the issue of Allah (God’s) knowledge of universals rather than particulars, where Ibn Rushd responded in his great travel Incoherence of Incoherence on Al-Ghazali in his great book Incoherence of the Philosophers, indicating that saying that Allah (God) knows universals without particulars is contrary to the words of the Peripatetic sages with the exception of Ibn Sina, who disagreed with him Ibn Rushd; Al-Ghazali agreed in his criticism of Ibn Sina and the implications of this saying in which he claims that Allah (God) Almighty and sanctified knows the universals rather than the particulars; Because this contradicts Ibn Rushd's affirmation of the Most Beautiful Names and Attributes of Allah (God), especially the attribute of knowledge to Allah (God) Almighty and sanctified.
Because of the restriction of Al-Ghazali to the books of Ibn Sina, Al-Ghazali ruled on the origins of the early ancient philosophers and the Peripatetic sages, that their doctrine on the matter is that of Avicenna, which called Ibn Rushd to respond to Al-Ghazali and defend the Peripatetic sages with the exception of Ibn Sina, who was influenced by Aristotle, who believes that the Creator is unreasonable and unreasonable. He knows nothing and does not move; Ibn Rushd believes that Ibn Sina has violated the Peripatetic sages in what he went to; Because they see that the gender of Allah (God) Almighty’s knowledge of universals and particulars is different from the gender of human knowledge of them, and that Allah (God) Almighty’s knowledge is a cause of known existence, in contrast to human knowledge which is the cause of this known existence.