Colonial/Anti-colonial Ideology In Paul Scott's The Raj Quartet 
And Raja Rao's Kanthapura

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Abstract

The thesis aims at studying the ideology behind writing both of the Raj Quartet and Kanthapura. The study adopts Macherey's definition of the concept of ideology, and its relation to literature. For Macherey, examining the work of art in relation to its historical background and the conditions of its production would allow for reaching for the ideology behind it. The thesis explores the attitudes of both writers towards both the colonial project and the national movements, in addition to the process of decolonization which took place as a result of national movements. The study examines the two texts in relation to their historical background, allowing, therefore, for presenting an ideological reading of them. Paul Scott is dealing with the last days of the British in India. He laments the end of the British empire and mourns the death of an ideal upon which the concept of the Raj is founded. Raja Rao, reflects the effect of the Gandhian national movement, as well as his social teachings, on the remotest village in India and how they managed to raise the consciousness of the Indian people towards their freedom from colonial rule.

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الإيديولوجية الاستعمارية والمناهضة لها في رباعية الروائي كاثبارة لراجا راو

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ملخص

تهدف الرسالة إلى البحث عن الإيديولوجية وراء كتابه كلا من رباعية الراجا راو، كاثبارة والروائيات تشبيهًا للأدب. وفيما تتميز الدراسة تعريف مشترى لمصطلح الإيديولوجية وعلاقاته بالأدب، فعند ماظوري دراسة العمل الأدبي في إطار الحقبة التاريخية، وظروف كتابته يساعد على الوصول إلى الإيديولوجية وراء كتابه هذا النص الأدبي. تكشف الدراسة عن موقف كلا من الكاتبين من المشروع الاستعماري وحركات المقاومة، إلى جانب الموافق من عالم الجلاء الناتجة عن القوة الاستعمارية. تقوم الدراسة بوضع كل من النصين في إطارهما التاريخي، في محاولة تقديم قراءة إيديولوجية لما. يتناول بول سكوت في كتابه الراجا راو، إشارة للحكم الإنجليزي في الهند والصقري أوكون تبت تفسير الفقدان الفكر ودوره في القصة، كما يرد في كتابة كاثبارة، تأثير حركات المقاومة التي كان يتعاطها غاندي، وأيضًا تعاليم المجتمع الهندي وحول القري الناتجة عن الصراع له، مع تأثير الرواية كيف تم قيم غاندي الربط وعلاقته بالمجتمع الهندي تجاه قضية الاستقلال وضرورة الحكم الإنجليزي.
Chapter (1)

Historical background

The fate and history of the British Empire was greatly affected by the First World War, particularly with regards to its relation to India, which witnessed a great shift after the war. It was during this period that the empire faced many challenges, the most significant of which is the rise of nationalist movements. The war, as Johnson says in his book *British Imperialism*, "…encouraged large numbers throughout the Empire to reconsider their position vis-à-vis Britain" (132), and while there were those who showed immense 'loyalty' to the Empire, there were others whose antagonism to colonial rule increased. To validate and 'justify' the war against its other European enemies, Britain had to implement and propagate new 'moral' ideas which, according to Lloyd, were "...hard to reconcile with maintaining imperial power for an indefinite period of time" (145). In talking about 'the rights of small nations' and 'the right of national self-determination', Britain was referring to the people who had been under the rule of its enemy. However, these ideas transcended the European borders and started to be adopted by colonized subjects "in a way that directly challenged all imperial rule" (145). Therefore, after WWI and until the date India has gained its independence, the impatience of the colonized people had increased; they became fervent with their anti-colonial feelings towards the British and their empire. Their struggle for freedom reached its highest and fiercest stages, and hence, it was the beginning of the end and led to the fall of the mightiest empire at the time.

Both of the Indian writer Raja Rao and the English novelist Paul Scott, in their novels, *Kanthapura* and *The Raj Quartet* respectively, deal with the issues of empire. They tackle the factors which led to the decline of the empire, though from different perspectives and concentrating on the events of particular decades. Raja Rao took the events of the 20s and 30s of the twentieth century as the subject matter of his novel. It was the time when the Indian national struggle was at its highest, especially with the emergence of Gandhi. The novel treats the Gandhian mass movements and
thoughts, which had such a profound effect on the Indian social and national life. Scott, on the other hand, deals with the 40s and the last decades of the British rule in India. At that time England faced very challenging circumstances, both at home and in its colonies, which represented a great test to its invincible power. The Second World War and the various national movements represented real danger that threatened its strength and ability to hold on to its colonies, and which led to its eventual decline. Scott, however, in his attempts to assess the empire and its practices, visits earlier decades and makes references to them.

Generally, 'the Indian English writers' tackled the various 'challenges of the time' with immense eagerness and 'enthusiasm', more so within the 'colonial complexities' (Kumar, 1). Historical incidents particularly, greatly affected them and had their role to play in attracting their attention and 'shaping' their minds. Moreover, they showed greater interest in the kind of writing which deals with 'historical events', and they were determined to give an explanation to current historical events through their minuscule images and representations (Kumar, 1-2). Naik says that the 'winds of change' which had started to 'blow' in India progressively and 'steadily' after the 'great Revolt of 1857', had their important and notable impact on both the political and social life of the country (114). The First World War, moreover, coming to an end, proved to be an important phase of the Indian life as well, since it marked the appearance of the 'Gandhian whirlwind' which brought massive and important changes to the country on both the political and social levels, destroying 'established' ideas and brining in 'new' and fresh ones (114).

'Indian English literature' was greatly influenced by all the events, incidents, and 'developments' of the Gandhian age, particularly "...the nationalist upsurge [which] had stirred the entire Indian society to the roots", in an exceptional and 'unprecedented' way. It, according to Naik, had stimulated the whole of the "Indian society to the roots... making it actually conscious of the pressures of the present in all fields of national life..." (118). Literature was, therefore, affected by the national 'consciousness' and the novel, in particular, was 'flowering' and flourishing during the 1930s when the 'Gandhian movement was perhaps at its strongest'. Amongst those
novelists who were immensely affected by Gandhi and his movement was Raja Rao (1908-2006). Rao comes from 'an ancient South Indian Brahmin family', and spent 'part' of his childhood with his grandfather who greatly affected him spiritually. This fact, Naik argues, can be affirmed by studying Rao's novels, and considering his spiritual 'concern' which distinguishes and 'characterizes' his works (166). In 1929, Rao traveled to France to study and “do his research on the mysticism of the west'. However, his 'exile' did not affect his relation to his country, but it rather consolidated and 'strengthened' his 'passionate attachment to the Indian ethos” (Naik, 166). According to Sharma, Raja Rao is one of the most prominent “Indian English novelists”, because of his “…wide range of thought content – philosophical, intellectual, political and social – and his command of the fictional form, language and technique”. He, moreover, is considered to be the most notable and 'distinguished' amongst his contemporaries, such as Mulk Raj Anand and R.K. Narayan, whose aims in their novels, unlike Rao, was 'the Indian Social reality' (Sharma, VII).

In her article ‘Kanthapura: A study in Gandhian Perspective’, Priyanka Kumari argues that Raja Rao is ‘considered to be a major voice in the historiography of Indian narrative art’, and his novel Kanthapura reflects the immense impact of Gandhi and Gandhian ideology on him. It is considered to be a "dynamic and daring documentation of Indian freedom movement, traditional religious belief and contemporary social construct" (Kumar, 37). Kumari says that Rao is greatly influenced by Gandhi and his ideology, which is considered to be 'one of the most challenging ideologies of the era', and his immense belief in the Mahatma made him idealize him 'as a true God' (Kumar, 40). The main theme of Kanthapura (1938), says Kumari, deals with “Gandhi, Gandhian revolution and its impact on a small South Indian village” (Kumar, 37). It gives a “meaningful and inspiring critique on the Indian national movement” (Kumar, 7), as it is 'Rao's only novel before Independence', and the best representation of the Gandhian age (Naik, 168). It is the story of a small South Indian village that is affected by the rage and ‘maelstrom’ of the struggle
for freedom of the nineteen thirties. It is a remote village, that is “situated high on the ghats up the Malabar coast”, in which the most important happening has been “…traditionally…the ploughing of the fields at the first rains”. However, it was affected in the 1930s by the “Gandhian whirlwind”, and it was “…transformed so completely in the end” (Naik, 166). In Kanthapura, Rao is trying to show the deep and strong impact of the Gandhian movement, and how the “nationalistic urge” has ‘penetrated’ even the exotic villages. This “new upsurge” was entirely combined with their “traditional religious faith”, allowing, therefore, for “rediscovering the Indian soul” and identity (Naik, 166-167).

Raja Rao's Kanthapura was written in 1938, a period when WWII was at its brink. However, it reflects on Gandhi's movements of non-cooperation that took place in the 1920s, and the Civil disobedience movement in the 1930s with special reference to the Irwin pact and the truce period. In India, there was a noticeable change of attitude towards the British after World War I. Although India continued to support the British in their war "supporting the war efforts" by offering a 'large' army, 'food', 'raw materials', 'equipment' (Johnson, 132), their 'loyalty', however, ceased. Their withdrawal was due to the heightening national feelings, and because of the failure of the British to keep up the promises they had made to the Indian people during war time. In India's Struggle For Independence 1857-1947, Mridula Mukherjee says that in 1914, and out of a 'keen' interest to "arouse nationalist political activity", the "Home Rule" movement was founded (qtd in Chandra, 160). It aimed to "demand that India be granted self-government on the lines of the white colonies after the war" (160). The British, in an attempt to appease the Indians, who decided to make use of the critical phase of World War I to fight and gain self-government, decided to make some changes in their policies. They offered "the increasing association of Indians in every branch of the administration, and the gradual development of self-governing institutions, with a view to the progressive realization of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire" (168). However, it became obvious that though the British government made such an offer, it was not ready to 'grant' the Indians their demands for 'self-
government', because the "nature and the timing of the advance towards responsible government would be decided by the government alone gave it enough leeway to prevent any real transfer of power to Indian hands for a long enough time" (168). Moreover, the British atrocities and 'brutal' behavior had made it clear that they had no intentions to deliver their "war time promises" to the Indian people. The Indians, on the other hand, had been subjected to immense political awakening and were getting more aware of the British atrocious and appalling actions. They were affected and "awakened to political consciousness" by the "incessant propaganda efforts" that had been made by national leaders for decades (185). Moreover, they were ‘outraged’ by what they viewed to be ‘insults’ to them by the “British government”, and it seemed ‘dishonorable’ and ‘cowardly’ to them to ‘swallow’ these insults (185). In addition, the Indian people suffered immensely “considerable economic distress”: “In the towns, the workers and artisans, the lower middle class and the middle class had been hit by high process, and shortage of food and essential commodities. The rural poor and peasants were in addition victims of widespread drought and epidemics” (185). Thus, they started to become impatient and angry and started contemplating real ‘actions’ against the British. The Congress, observing the impatience and rage of the people, and that they were ‘chafing’ for actions, decided to start non-cooperation movement in 1920 under the leadership of Gandhi (185). Therefore, in 1920 Gandhi 'launched formally' the 'non-cooperation' movement "after the expiry of the notice...given to the viceroy in his letter of 22nd June, in which he had asserted the right recognized 'from time immemorial of the subject to refuse to assist a ruler who misrules' " (185).

The programme of non-cooperation movement involved surrendering the “titles and honours”, boycotting “government affiliated” schools, colleges, law courts, and foreign clothes”. It also included the “resignation from government service”. On the other hand, mass civil disobedience involved the “non-payment of taxes”, in addition to the setting up of colleges, national schools, and the establishment of ‘panchayats’ for “settling disputes”. The movement
encouraged also “hand-spinning” and ‘weaving’, maintaining “Hindu-Muslim unity”, giving up ‘untouchability’, and called to “observe strict non-violence” (186). The movement worked well, and its success and 'spirit of unrest and defiance' had even provoked and stimulated many other movements across the country (190). It, however, was impossible to maintain the 'non-violent' nature of the movement, which did not last for long. Hence, in 1922 Gandhi took the decision to withdraw the movement because of a violent act that had broken out in one of the Indian villages. Being aware of the 'nature' of 'mass movements', Gandhi understood that mass anger and activity would shift to violence. Hence, the authorities would be provided with the chance to initiate their brutal attack and repression on the masses, which will, in turn, spoil and ruin Gandhi’s main aim of the movement. Gandhi's major goal of his non-violent movement was to show and 'expose' the true nature of the government, and its atrocious and brutal attitudes. Therefore, he demanded that no other movements should take place in any other place while he is undertaking the non-cooperation movement in one of the villages; for fear that these movements would break into violence. He believed that:

… if violence occurred anywhere it could easily be made the excuse by the Government to launch a massive attack on the movement as a whole. The Government could always cite the actual violence in one part as proof of the likelihood of violence in another part of the country and thus justify its repression. This would upset the whole strategy of non-violent civil disobedience which was based on the principle that the forces of repression would always stand exposed since they would be using armed force against peaceful civil resisters. (192-193)

Another reason for withdrawing the movement was that it had started to recede and showed signs of tiredness and exhaustion. Everyone started to return to their normal life, with students getting back to their schools, and lawyers and ‘litigants’ to their courts. Businessmen and those who belonged to the “commercial classes” started to worry about their business and the “accumulating stocks of foreign cloth”. The fact that people started to abandon ‘meetings’ and ‘rallies’, both in the “urban and rural areas”, proved that the
“…masses were not ready to carry on the struggle”. The eagerness and ‘enthusiasm’ of the people that was obvious in 1921 faded and ‘receded’ (194-195). Therefore, Gandhi, understanding the nature of mass movements and the inability of the masses to endure the ‘repression’ and brutality for so long, decided to withdraw it and allow it a break to revitalize and rejuvenate. He was aware of the fact that mass movements needed the “active participation” of all people, not only the “highly motivated”. Besides, they involve that inclination to “ebb after reaching a certain height”, because the ability of the masses to resist ‘repression’, “make sacrifices”, and “endure suffering” is limited. Therefore, people needed time to ‘consolidate’, ‘recuperate’, ‘gather strength’, and prepare themselves for a further struggle. Therefore, “…withdrawal or a shift to a place of non-confrontation is an inherent part of a strategy of political action that is based on the masses. Withdrawal is not tantamount to betrayal; it is an inevitable part of the strategy itself” (194-195).

The withdrawal of the movement does not mean its failure, for it succeeded on various levels. The movement spread broadly across the country and reached out to millions of the Indian people all over the country. It gained the “support and sympathy of vast sections of the Indian people”, as it succeeded in raising the awareness of the masses and mobilizing millions of Indian peoples from all walks of life, like the “Indiana peasants, workers, artisans, shopkeepers, traders, professionals” (Chandra,195). Hence, proving to the British rulers that the movement represents all Indian people and not only a 'microscopic minority' as was claimed by the British (qtd in Chandra, 195). Moreover, the ability of the poor Indian people to fight for their liberation was demonstrated through their struggles, endurance and sacrifices. It showed that this fight for freedom is the cause of all sections of society and not only that of the educated and rich people (195-196). It, also, had its impact on both the peasants and workers, and had improved their political awareness and brought to their consciousness national ideology. The 'discontent' of the peasants with the government and their struggles against it had been always triggered by their narrow and local interests, 'immediate grievances' and their 'immediate' needs. But
with the effect of the national movement, their struggles started to have a different shape and a different goal, that of the liberation of their country: "Peasant discontent against established authority was a familiar feature of the nineteenth century. But in the twentieth century, the movements that emerged out of this discontent were marked by a new feature: they were deeply influenced by and in their turn had marked impact on the ongoing struggle for national freedom" (197). The national movement had a similar effect on the workers as well. Chandra says that: "The process of the disparate groups of workers in various parts of country emerging as an organized, self-conscious, all India class is inextricably linked with the growth of the Indian national movement and the process of the Indian 'nation-in-the-making'" (210). Like the peasants, before the national ideology was brought to their awareness and consciousness, the workers also used to 'strike' and fight for their wretched state and terrible economic: "...there were several agitations, including strikes by workers...they were mostly sporadic, spontaneous and unorganized revolts based on immediate economic grievances, and had hardly any wider political implications" (210). The 'withdrawal' of the non-cooperation movement by Gandhi in 1922 had resulted in the arrest of Gandhi himself. In addition, it had drastic effects on the national movement itself, as it led to "the spread of disintegration, disorganization and demoralization in the nationalist ranks" (Chandra, 235).

After its period of 'rest and recoupment', the "mass anti-imperialist upsurge" started again in 1927, taking a new turn. It was a response to an act produced by the British government which stated that 'issues' concerning the British empire in India should not be left for the "Labour Government", which the conservatives saw as 'irresponsible' and 'inexperienced':

…it was the British Government that provided a catalyst and a rallying ground by an announcement...of an all-White commission to recommend whether India was ready for further constitutional progress and on which lines...the Conservative Government of Britain...suddenly decided that it could not leave an issue which concerned the future of the British Empire in the irresponsible hands of an inexperienced Labour Government; and
it was thus that the Indian Statutory Commission, popularly known as the Simon commission...was appointed. (Chandra, 260)

The statement meant that no Indian was seen to be responsible enough or fit to rule India and serve the Indian people. It was felt as an offense by the Indian people, and stimulated their anger. Hence, it resulted in another mass movement led by the Indian National Congress. According to Chandra, “The response in India was immediate and unanimous. That no Indian should be thought fit to serve on a body that claimed the right to decide the political future of India was an insult that no Indian of even the most moderate political opinion was willing to swallow. The call for a boycott of the commission was endorsed” (261).

As a response to the Simon commission, therefore, a report, known as the "Nehru Report" was submitted which demanded for the 'Dominion Status' of India. It declared that if the demand is not accepted then the Congress would demand complete and immediate dependence, and would go on launching its Civil Disobedience movement to achieve its aim for freedom (Chandra, 263-264). However, in 1929, and after the Round Table Conference to discuss the Nehru Report, it was made clear by Lord Irwin that the British Government had no intentions to grant India its demand for Dominion Status. Hence, "the stage of negotiations was over and the stage of confrontation was about to begin" when Gandhi took the decision to launch his Civil Disobedience Movement (266).

The Lahore Congress of 1929 had authorized the Working Committee to launch a programme of civil disobedience including non-payment of taxes. It had also called upon all members of legislatures to resign their seats. In mid-February, 1930, the Working Committee...invested Gandhiji with full powers to launch the Civil Disobedience Movement at a time and place of his choice. (270)

Therefore, 'civil disobedience' was the only solution and the only 'way out' to the disregard shown by the British to the Indian demands (270). It was launched by Gandhi when he decided to walk for 240 miles 'from his headquarters in Ahmadabad' to the beach, where he
was to break the salt laws by collecting salt, encouraging, therefore, millions of Indians to break the salt laws (271). Chandra says that: “on 6 April 1930, by picking up a handful of salt, Gandhiji inaugurated the Civil Disobedience Movement, a movement that was to remain unsurpassed in the history of the Indian national movement for the country-wide mass participation it unleashed” (272). The Gandhian move and 'strategy' led to the confusion and bewilderment of the government. It had been predicted by the government that ignoring Gandhi's move and its ‘non-interference with the movement’, would lead to its ‘spending itself out’, and eventually the failure of Gandhi’s ‘salt strategy’. But, contrary to its perceptions, it found itself in a state wherein it was unable to either 'repress' the movement using violence or ignore it. A state which was the main goal and aim of Gandhi on deciding to launch his movement:

The dilemma in which it found itself was a dilemma that the Gandhian strategy of non-violent civil disobedience was designed to create. The Government was placed in a classic 'damned if you do, damned if you don't' fix, i.e., if it did not suppress a movement that brazenly defied its laws, its administrative authority would be seen to be undermined and its control would be shown to be weak, and if it did suppress it, it would be seen as a brutal, anti-people administration that used violence on non-violent agitators. …Either way, it led to the erosion of the hegemony of the British Government. (273-274)

As a 'conciliatory gesture' from the British government, a Round Table Conference in London was held. It was the first in which both the British and Indians were to meet as 'equals', and one during which many 'discussions' were to be held "to explore the possibilities of peace between the Congress and the Government" (279-280). It resulted in "the Gandhi-Irwin Pact', that was described as a "truce" (280). The 'Pact' stirred up different opinions. It was met with deep resentment, and was condemned and rejected by many sections of the Indian society. Many looked at it as a 'betrayal' to the Indians and their interests as it serves more the interests of the 'bourgeoisie':

The Pact has been variously seen as a betrayal, as proof of the vacillating nature of the Indian bourgeoisie and of Gandhiji
succumbing to bourgeois pressure, it has been cited as evidence of Gandhiji's and the Indian bourgeoisie's fear of the mass movement taking a radical turn; a betrayal of peasants' interest because it did not immediately restore confiscated land, already sold to a third party, and so on. (281)

But at the same time, there were those who supported it. They were more 'impressed' by the fact that the British considered their movement and their demands. Besides, the British were treating their ‘leader’ as an ‘equal’, and were signing a pact with him. For them, such a step marked a kind of a ‘recognition’ for their ‘own strength’, and a “victory of the Government”. Those who were released from jails in accordance to the pact, were treated as “…soldiers returning from a victorious battle”, and not as “…prisoners of war returning from a humiliating defeat”. They regained their ‘faith’ and their trust, both in themselves and in their leader, realizing that a ‘truce’ was not a ‘surrender’, but that the “…battle could be joined again, if the enemy so wanted” (281-282). However, Britain, in 1931, during the Second Round Table Conference with the Congress, showed once more that there was no intention or readiness to give any ‘economic cessions’ to India. Besides, those who would "lead to its independence from their control", and even Churchill, the leader of the ‘right-wing’ party, refused any discussions or 'negotiations' ‘on terms of equality’ with the Indians and further "demanded strong government in India" (Chandra, 285). It was, moreover, made clear and asserted that "Without India, the British Commonwealth would fall to pieces. Commercially, economically, politically and geographically it is our greatest imperial asset. To imperil our hold on it would be the worst treason any Briton could commit." (285). Therefore, the Round Table conference in 1931 ended with a rejection of India’s ‘demand for freedom’ (286).

Following the signing of the 'pact' between Irwin and Gandhi, and the Second Round Table conference in London, the British realized their mistake in holding meetings and negotiations with the Indians as 'equal' to them. They came to believe that this act had 'undermined' their own status and rank, whereas it uplifted the confidence and self-esteem of the people and increased their political
Rasha Ahmed Zayed

standard. Chandra says that: “They were now determined to reverse it all. No pact, no truce, no Gandhi-Viceroy meetings, no 'quarter for the enemy' became the watchwords of Government policy” (286). The British then started to have many 'considerations' which would allow them to preserve their rule in India. The first was to prevent Gandhi from launching another mass movement while the second, was to try not to disappoint and dispirit their 'friends' and their Indian 'loyalists' by the idea that Gandhi "...was being 'resurrected as a rival authority to the Government of India,' and that the Government was losing the will to rule", a state which would eventually result in losing their loyalty and their support (286). The Government decided to 'blow' strongly and 'immediately' against its 'revival', and to arrest Gandhiji at its 'outset' (286). In 1932, the Government started its 'strike' on the national movement by arresting Gandhi and many “leading Congressmen”. It instigated what was called "Civil Martial Law" which triggered the anger of the Indian people who responded massively (287). But the 'non-violent movement' by the Indian people was brutally and heavily 'repressed' by the government, and therefore, the movement was 'crushed' until the time when Gandhiji had to take the decision of 'withdrawing' it once again in 1934: "...Gandhi and other leaders had no time to build up the tempo of the movement and it could not be sustained for long. The movement was effectively crushed within a few months. ... However, the movement continued to linger till early April 1934 when the inevitable decision to withdraw it was taken by Gandhiji" (Chandra, 288).

Gandhi’s decisions to withdraw his mass movements had provoked the anger of many who started to reject his strategies. With the rising threat that the movement would slide and 'lapse' into a period of 'passivity' after the 'suspension of the non-cooperation' movement in 1922, the people started to question Gandhi’s 'strategy'. Others embarked on searching for new and 'alternative' ways to get out of this 'impasse' and continue with the struggle for freedom (Chandra, 235). Therefore, after the movement 'lapping' into its 'passive phase', there appeared the need to find out how 'political work' would be carried out by the movement in its 'non-active phase' (237). This gave rise to two groups who offered two solutions. First,
there were the 'Swarajists', who called for a change in strategy. Second, there were the 'non-changers', who stuck to Gandhi's strategy of 'constructive work'. The 'Swarajists' tended to look for 'work in the councils', and they believed that by entering the councils they will be able "to fill in the temporary political void". They sought the strategy which: “… would keep up the morale of the politicized Indians, fill the empty newspaper spaces, and enthuse the people". They believed that "Electioneering and speeches in the councils would provide fresh avenues for political agitation and propaganda" (237). Moreover, they believed that they would enter the councils and weaken them from the inside, and further use them as 'grounds' for their political struggles. Chandra says that: “…the Swarajists claimed that they would transform the legislatures into arenas of political struggle and that their intention was not to use them…as organs for the gradual transformation of the colonial state, but to use them as the ground on which the struggle for the overthrow of the colonial state was to be carried out” (237). On the other hand, the 'no-changers' were against 'council entry' because they believed that this move will ignore, and even will have a negative effect on the strategy of pursuing 'constructive work'. Moreover, entering the council will have a corrupting influence on those national leaders who had claimed to enter it to destroy, weaken and 'wreck' them. They believed that, instead of destroying and 'wrecking' the councils, these leaders would “gradually give up the politics of obstruction". They would get absorbed by the councils and 'sucked' into them, and would, therefore, be of more help to the 'imperial constitutional framework' (237). Therefore the 'no-changers' believed that the solution for the 'passivity' of the movement is to resort to and indulge more in constructive work, which would help preparing the masses for “…the next round of civil disobedience” (237). According to Bipan Chandra, constructive work was 'multi-faceted in its content' since it …brought some much-needed relief to the poor, it promoted the process of the nation-in-the-making; and it made the urban-based and upper caste cadres familiar with the conditions of villages and lower casts. It provided Congress political workers or cadres
continuous and effective work in the passive phases of the national movement, helped build their bonds with those sections of the masses who were hitherto untouched by politics, and developed their organizing capacity and self-reliance. It filled the rural masses with a new hope and increased Congress influence among them. (245-246)

Therefore, the years from 1922 to 1927 were marked by immense unrest and 'contradictory developments'. Whilst both the 'Swarajists' and the 'no-changers' were indulging each in his own work and realm actively, there emerged active 'factionalism' and 'indiscipline' in both parties which, by turn, culminated in an immense sense of 'frustration' (246). In addition, a third group emerged during that time of those people who had been shocked by the "suspension of the movement and who lost their 'faith'" in the 'national leadership' and its 'strategy'. They started to "…question the very basic strategy of the national leadership and its emphasis on non-violence", hence, they searched for alternative ways. A group of people who had taken the decision to give up and 'suspend' their own active work in order to give Gandhi and his movement better opportunity to work with its full force felt great and deep disappointment. Having no interest to join either the 'Swarajists', with their 'parliamentary politics', or the 'no-changers' and their resort to constructive work, they believed that resorting to violence is the only main weapon by which they can fight to gain the freedom of their country. Hence, emerged what is known as 'Revolutionary Terrorism' (247). The Revolutionary Terrorists had their own 'limitations'. They were not able to either connect with the masses or 'politically activate' them and 'move them into political actions'. However, they had a positive impact, because they helped in spreading 'nationalist consciousness'. They succeeded in motivating the Indian people by their 'deep patriotism, courage and determination, and sense of sacrifice' (258-259). Therefore, the 'suspension' of the non-cooperation movement did not end the political work or national struggle for freedom, but it was rather kept alive by various groups who were active during the 'passive' stages of the movement. Chandra concludes that

In the years following the end of the Non-Cooperation Movement
in 1922, the torch of nationalism had been kept alive by the Gandhian constructive workers who dug their roots deep into village soil, by the Swarajists who kept the Government on its toes in the legislatures...and countless others who engaged themselves in organizational, ideological and agitational activities at a variety of levels. (Chandra, 260)

Likewise, the withdrawal of the 'civil-disobedience' movement led to the 'despair' and desolation of many of the national leaders, like Subhash Chandra Bose, Vithalbhai Patel, and Jawaharlal Nehru who got disappointed by Gandhi's decision. Many others lost faith in Gandhi and in his leadership and even called for a "... radical reorganization of the Congress on a new principle with a new method, for which a new leader is essential" (288-289).

The withdrawal of the Civil Disobedience Movement, for the second time, in 1935 generated a great 'debate' amongst the nationalists who were to find answers to many and various questions. Once again, they found themselves in a position wherein they were trying to find out what turn the national movement should take after its 'suspension' and 'during its phase of non-mass struggle'. They were trying to find out how to 'overcome' this stage of passivity and 'political paralysis' (Bipan Chandra 311). Hence the two movements referred to earlier: the Gandhian constructive work by the 'no-changers', or the constitutional method of struggle by the Swarajists dominated the nationalist scene. However, a third movement emerged which was 'critical' of both, for it believed that both trends would distract the people and divert their attention from the major struggle for freedom. It is a trend which was 'developed' in the 1930s, and was offered by the Left, which: "...instead favoured the continuation or resumption of the non-constitutional mass movement since they felt that the situation continued to be revolutionary because of the continuing economic crisis and the readiness of the masses to fight" (312). It was Jawaharlal Nehru who was the leader and the representative of the Left and its opposing strategy to Gandhi and his 'anti-imperialist programme and strategy' (312). Nehru believed that "the withdrawal of the Civil Disobedience Movement and council-entry and the recourse to constructive programmes
represented a 'spiritual defeat' and a surrender of ideals, a retreat from the revolutionary..." (312). He rather wanted to make use of the 'class struggle' and the inclination of the people to fight for better economic conditions and to help them integrate with the Congress and take part in its national struggle. Hence, they would share in a mass and real struggle against the exploitative foreign rule. Chandra says that:

The way out, said Nehru, lay in grasping the class basis of society and the role of class struggle and in 'revising vested interests in favour of the masses.' This meant taking up or encouraging the day-to-day class, economic demands of the peasants and workers against landlords and capitalists, organizing the former in their class organizations...and permitting them to affiliate with the Congress and thus, influence and direct its policies and activities. There could be, said Nehru, no genuine anti-imperialist struggle which did not incorporate the class struggle of the masses. (313)

Nehru had always expressed his ‘disbelief in the ‘Gandhian strategy' and its ‘inadequacy'. He had always been calling for the importance of bringing in "new, socialist or Marxist ideology, which would enable the people to study their social condition scientifically” (313). Nehru, as Chandra notes, had always defied and disputed Gandhi’s ‘strategy of struggle’, which is described as “struggle – Truce – Struggle (S-T-S)” (313). The Gandhian strategy was based on the notion that through its prolonged process, during which it encounters alternating stages of activity and passivity, it should maintain its political work. By creating and disseminating its own ideology, the Gandhian strategy would enable the destruction of the colonial ideology of the British rule, that it is an invincible and a benevolent power. At the same time it aims at raising the political consciousness of the people to develop the confidence and strength to fight for their freedom. Chandra says:

...phases of a vigorous extra-legal mass movement and confrontation with colonial authority alternate with phases, during which direct confrontation is withdrawn, political concessions or reforms, if any, wrested from the colonial regime, are willy-nilly worked and silent political work carried on among the masses within the existing legal framework, which, in turn, provides scope for such work. Both phases of the movement are
to be utilized, each in its own way, to undermine the twin ideological notions on which the colonial regime rested – that British rule benefits Indians and that it is too powerful to be challenged and overthrown – and to recruit and train cadres and to build up the people’s capacity to struggle. the entire political process of S-T-S was an upward spiraling one, which also assumed that the freedom struggle would pass through several stages, ending with the transfer of power by the colonial regime itself’ (313)

However, Nehru was against this prolonged ‘strategy’ and had no faith in it. He understood and accepted the fact that mass movements would encounter ‘setbacks’, and would face “phases of upswing and downswing”. However, he believed that that should not lead to a stage of passivity, or to that “stage of compromise or ‘cooperation’” with the colonial rule. For Nehru, ‘permanent hostility’ and ‘non cooperation’ against the colonial rule should be maintained. Furthermore, the Indian national movement had reached that phase wherein it should continue its unending ‘confrontation’, and direct ‘conflict’ with imperialism until freedom is achieved. Therefore, for Nehru, even if the mass movement would be at a ‘low ebb’, this “aggressive direct policy” should be sustained and it must continue (313-314). He was, therefore, against the ‘withdrawal’ of the Civil Disobedience Movement for it might lead to a kind of ‘compromise with imperialism’ which would, in turn, be seen as a ‘betrayal of the cause. He criticized the prospect of ‘winning freedom through stages’, and believed that ‘power’ “…could not be won gradually ‘bit by bit’”. Therefore, instead if Gandhi’s ‘S-T-S’, Nehru offered the continuous and “permanent waging of mass struggle till victory was won” (314). On the other hand, Gandhi being aware of the immense opposition to him and his strategy in the Congress, both from the ‘leftists’ and the ‘Swarajists’, refrained from trying to dominate the Congress or 'suppress' these contradictory ideas. He preferred to rather resign with the belief of having better ways to serve the Congress and the Indian cause against imperialism (315-316).

Congressmen who were disillusioned by Gandhian strategy got attracted by socialist ideology( Chandra, 304-305). This ideology
Rasha Ahmed Zayed

also spread among the Indians especially those who were disappointed by Ghandi’s policy (297). Therefore, along with the national ideology and the call for independence, a socialist ideology started to make its way into the Indian society. It appeared in the 1920s and the 1930s with the rise of the Left wing within the National Congress playing a crucial role in the 'radicalization' of the national movement. The rise of socialist ideas interwove with the national struggle for independence, and many Indians supported the socialist call, whose leader was Nehru (298). Nehru wanted the struggle for freedom on political terms to be connected to the social and economic freedom of the masses (297-298). The two main ‘urges’ which affected him: “…were 'nationalism and political freedom as represented by the Congress and social freedom as represented by socialism’” (300). However, Nehru's aim was not to undermine the significance of the national struggle for freedom. Though he wanted to bring the two realms together, the national and social, he was at the same time fully aware of the importance of the freedom and national struggle. Therefore, he believed that his ‘commitment’ to socialism should be ‘recognized’ in relation to the ‘political’ and ‘anti-imperialist struggle’ as long as India was under the foreign rule.

Nehru, therefore, did not favour the creation of an organization independent of or separate from the Congress or making a break with Gandhiji and the right-wing of the Congress. The task was to influence and transform the Congress as a whole in a socialist direction. And this could be best achieved by working under its banner and bringing its workers and peasants to play a greater role in its organization. And in no case, he felt, should the Left become a mere sect apart from the mainstream of the national movement. (Chandra, 300)

The period saw the emergence of another ideology, in addition to nationalist and socialist ideology, that is the communal ideology. Communal ideology, says Chandra, rests on the belief that people, who belong to the same religion and have the same faith, would have similar and 'common secular interests', such as 'political, economic, social and cultural interests’ (398). This conception produced socio-political communities based on religion; hence,
dividing the Indian society on religious grounds, and not on 'classes', 'nationalities', 'nations', 'linguistic-cultural groups', or any other group (398). The Indian people, therefore, "...can act socially, politically and protect their collective or corporate or non-individual interest only as members of these religion-based communities" (398).

This factor of the communal ideology would take another level in a 'multi-religious society' such as the Indian society. The 'secular interests' of the people who are the followers of a certain religion would naturally be different, 'dissimilar' and even 'divergent' from the interests of those who belong to a different faith (398). Consequently, says Chandra, a phase was reached when the interests of the followers of different religions, or of different 'communities', would be in 'conflict' and are viewed to be "...mutually incompatible, antagonistic and hostile" to each other, since their 'secular interests' are contradictory and 'opposed' to each other (399). Chandra adds that communal ideology appeared as a consequence of specific 'conditions' within the Indian society. Generally speaking, such ideologies as 'nationalism', 'communalism', and 'socialism', usually emerge when politics is brought to the consciousness of the people. They "...could emerge as politics and as ideology only after politics based on the people, politics of popular participation and mobilization, politics based on the creation and mobilization of public opinion had come into existence" (401).

Therefore, communalism appeared in the Indian society, amongst other ideologies, with the introduction of 'modern politics' to the masses (401). It came about as a result of the various 'transformations' that had ensued the Indian society, and which were brought about due to the influence of 'colonialism' and the necessity to fight it (401-402). Struggling for freedom necessitated the introduction of modern and 'new politics', which was founded primarily on the 'politicization' and 'mobilization' of the masses. Therefore, within the social, political, and economic changes that were taking place within the Indian society, people were keen on figuring out new ways to identify themselves and create their 'new identities'. Chandra says:

The growing economic, political and administrative unification of
regions and the country, the process of making India into a nation, the developing contradiction between colonialism and the Indian people and the formation of modern social classes and strata called for new ways of seeing one's common interests. They made it necessary to have wider links and loyalties among the people and to form new identities. (402)

The acquisition of the ‘new’ and ‘emerging’ ‘social relation’ and ‘political reality’, the process of introducing 'new politics' to the awareness of the people, and the formation of 'new identities' was a long and difficult path. It involved the ‘adoption’ and implementation of “new unifying principles, new social and political identities with the aid of new ideas and concepts”. Therefore, there were those who abandoned it, believing in its inadequacy and started to look for other methods which would serve their own peculiar and 'narrow' interests in a short span of time. People resorted to ‘old’ methods of identifying themselves with class, castes, religions, and there were those who helped in the conversion of religion to ‘communal’ awareness since it serves certain needs (402).

Chandra says that the influence of colonialism on the Indian economy and its ‘underdevelopment’ and deterioration under the colonial rule, was the major reason for the emergence of communalism. The decline of the Indian economy and its ‘stagnation’ had a drastic effect on the lives of the people, particularly the middle classes. Consequently, it generated ‘conditions’ which stirred up and encouraged conflicts, ‘hostility’ and ‘antagonism’ between various sections of the Indian society (403). The nationalist movements adopted ‘long-term’ ‘solutions’ for the problems of the people by ‘fighting’ against colonialism, and for ‘radical social transformations’. However, the middle classes, and ‘lower middle classes’, being the most to be affected by the economic ‘deterioration’ and ‘unemployment’ during the time, had no faith in the prolonged ‘strategy’ adopted by the nationalists. In fact, they formed the ‘backbone’ of the ‘militant national movement’ and the ‘left-wing parties’. Therefore, to serve their ‘narrow immediate interests’, they turned to ‘short-term solutions’ for their ‘sectional’ or ‘personal’ problems (403). The economic conditions at the time produced two different and ‘opposing’ groups and
ideologies amidst the middle classes. The first, was that group of middle class that earnestly and actively supported the national ‘cause’ at the time of the emergence and activity of the ‘anti-imperialist’ struggle and the social transformation it brought about: “They then readily advocated the cause and demands of the entire society from the capitalists to the peasants and workers, individual ambitions were then sunk in the wider social vision” (403). The second group, represented those who resorted to other ways, “to politics based on communalism and other similar ideologies”, to solve their own problems and serve their own interests when the movement entered its phase of inactivity (404). The major difference between the two groups, says Chandra, is that the personal and ‘social’ interests of the first group came together and were part of the ‘general social development’ and ‘their politics formed a part of the broader anti-imperialist struggle’. Whereas, the interests of the second group were rather ‘narrow and selfish’, they ‘accepted the socio-political status quo and objectively served colonialism’ (404). Therefore: “…communalism was deeply rooted in and was an expression of the interests and aspirations of the middle classes in a social situation in which opportunities for them were grossly inadequate” (404). However, not all middle class adopted communal ideology during the 1930s and 1940s, since many ‘intellectuals’ who belonged to the middle class kept away from communalism and “tended to be both secular and broadly Left-wing” (405).

In spite of the fact that communalism could thrive only ‘because of internal social and political conditions’, the British rule, with its strategy of ‘Divide and Rule’, played a crucial and important role in its ‘growth’ and development within the Indian society. It was encouraged by the imperial rule in order to ‘weaken’ and destroy the national movement, and hamper the “welding of the Indian people into a nation”. Hence, colonial rule made use of the communal ideology and propagated it among the Hindus and Muslims, with the claims of defending the ‘minorities’ from the tyranny and oppression of the ‘majority’:

Communalism was presented by the colonial rulers as the problem of the defense of minorities. Hindu-Muslim disunity –
and the need to protect the minorities from domination and suppression by the majority – was increasingly offered as the main justification for the maintenance of British rule, especially as theories of civilizing mission, white man’s burden, welfare of the ruled, etc., got increasingly discredited. (408)

Communalism started in India in the 1880s “when Syed Ahmed Khan counterposed it to the national movement initiated by the National Congress”. In 1887, the National Congress encountered severe attack by the British when its anti-imperialist frame became obvious. Syed Ahmed, therefore, took part in the ‘attack’ against the Congress, and showed his loyalty to the colonial regime, “believing that the Muslims’ share in administrative posts and in profession could be increased only by professing and proving loyalty to the colonial rulers…” (415). He, along with his supporters, embarked on establishing the ‘foundations’ of the ‘communal ideology’ and its main ‘themes’, which were “to be propagated in the first half of the 20th century” (415). He worked on spreading the belief that they needed the presence and protection of the British, for fear that the Hindu majority would dominate them if their representatives entered the government, or if the British left India:

A basic theme was that Hindus, because they were a majority, would dominate Muslims and ‘totally override the interests of the smaller community’ if representative, democratic government was introduced or if British rule ended and power was transferred to Indians. The British were needed to safeguard Muslims as a minority. (415)

With the break of mass movement, the communalists had to ‘enter the political arena’ and, hence, in 1907 “…the All India Muslim League was founded by a group of big zamindars, ex-bureaucrats and other upper class Muslims” (416). It was a “loyalist, communal and conservative political” party, which “…raised the slogan of separate Muslim interests, demanded separate electorates and safeguards for Muslims in government services, and reiterated all the major themes of communal policies and ideology”. The ‘League’ ‘directed’ its work and its ‘activities’ against the National Congress and the Hindus, and not against the colonial rule (417). On the other hand, ‘Hindu communalism’ had, at the same time, started to make
its appearance, and from the 1870s there were those ‘sections’ of the “Hindu zamindars, moneylenders and middle class professionals” who stirred antagonistic sentiment against Muslims, talking “of the ‘tyrannical’ Muslim rule in the medieval period and the ‘liberating’ role of the British in ‘saving’ Hindus from ‘Muslim oppression.’” (417). In 1909, the ‘Punjab Hindu Sabha’ was established, and its leaders were to work on the establishment and propagation of ‘communal ideology and politics’ amongst the Hindus, and particularly against the National Congress and its strategy to “unite the Indians into a single nation, and for ‘sacrificing Hindu interests’ to appease Muslims” (417-418). The British, therefore, being aware “of the inherent logic of communalism and the theory of the official protection of the minorities”, they propagated for communalism. They exploited it in order to divide the Indian people, hence, be able to strengthen and consolidate colonial rule in India (416). Communalism found in the withdrawal of the Gandhian movement in 1922 a golden opportunity to be resurrected and disclosed its horrible face:

The Non-Cooperation Movement was withdrawn in February 1922. As the people felt disillusioned and frustrated...communalism reared its ugly head and in the post-1922 years the country was repeatedly plunged into communal riots. Old communal organizations were revived and fresh ones founded. The Muslim League once again became active and was cleansed of radical and nationalist element. The upper class leaders with their open loyalism and frankly communal ideology once again came to the fore. The Hindu Mahasabha was revived in 1923 and openly began to cater anti-Muslim sentiments. Its proclaimed objective became ‘the maintenance, protection and promotion of Hindu race, Hindu culture and Hindu civilization... (Chandra, 422).

In addition to communalists, the princes of India were in favour of the British rule. They too offered their support to the British as they, according to Lloyd, “…felt that the king emperor would respect the monarchical principles which gave them their power, but they were not nearly so sure that Congress would accept their position if it held power in India" (155-158).
Chandra, moreover, argues that the capitalist class had played a crucial part in the national struggle for freedom as well, though their roles in the struggle varied. Many of the capitalists were ‘active’ supporters of the ‘national movement’ and became part of the Congress. They ‘identified with the movement’ and endured many ‘hardships’, while others were only offering it ‘financial and other help’ without joining. However, at the same time, there were other capitalists and traders who remained ‘neutral’ to the movement, and others were completely against it and ‘actively opposed it’ (375). The capitalists’ position and their relation to the colonial state was a unique one, since it grew ‘rapidly’ and progressed hugely and independently, not as ‘junior partners of foreign capital or as compradors’, but without depending or relying on the colonial administrations and without having to be obedient to the colonial ‘interests’ (376). The growth of the capitalist class didn't happen as a product of ‘colonialism’ or even ‘decolonization’, but it happened in spite of the opposition of the capitalists to the imperial rule and its exploitative policies, “by waging a constant struggle against colonialism and colonial interests, i.e., by wrenching space from colonialism itself” (376).

The Capitalists had their own way of struggling against imperialism. They preferred struggling on ‘constitutional’ sphere and ‘negotiating’ rather than joining in mass struggles which might affect them. Mukherjee says that the capitalist class “put its weight behind constitutional forms of struggle as opposed to mass civil disobedience”, and their apprehension came out of the “fear that mass civil disobedience, especially if it was prolonged, would unleash forces which could turn the movement revolutionary in a social sense”, and hence endanger capitalism (378). Moreover, it was reluctant to sustain any “prolonged all-out hostility to the government of the day as it prevented the continuing of day-to-day business and threatened the very existence of the class (378). The capitalists’ opposition to mass civil disobedience movement and their preference to resort to ‘constitutional path’ should not be taken as “getting co-opted into the imperial system or surrendering to it” (378-379). But their position with regard to the mass movement was a complicated one, for while they feared its threats to their class and
their interests, they were also aware of the crucial role it played and its importance in the struggle for freedom. In spite of its contradiction to the mass civil disobedience at times, the capitalist class never helped the government against it. They: “…pressurized the Government to stop repression, remove the ban on the Congress and the press, release political prisoners and stop arbitrary rule with ordinances as a first step to any settlement, even when the Congress was at the pitch of its non-constitutional mass phase” (380).

While Raja Rao deals with the events of the struggle of the Indian people against foreign rule, Scott, in his Quartet, deals with the events of the 40s which saw the last days of the raj in India. It witnessed the overthrow of the British rule from India, and Britain 'relinquishing' all of its empire. The Quartet is written during the period of 1965-1975, but the events are set against the events of the Second World War, a time when Britain found itself standing alone, without its allies, against Nazi Germany. The year 1939 saw the outbreak of the Second World War, but unlike the First World War when India gave England full support, the response was different. Chamberlain says that: "The First World War ended an epoch in Anglo-Indian relations" (20). The Indians lived with high expectations and waited for their 'reward' from the British for supporting them in their war, but the 'slowness' of the British people in their response to grant the Indians their demands came as a great disappointment. Furthermore, the British offers such as the 'Government of India Act 1919' which allowed realms like 'education and health' to be under 'Indian Control' while others like that of 'public order' to remain under the 'control' of the British people, were quite 'inadequate' and not enough satisfactory (20). Therefore, the Indian people were keen not to offer any help to the British and refused to support them in their war against the Germans. They, instead, believed that the war is not theirs, and they rejected any involvement. They disliked the idea that the British are declaring war 'on their behalf'. Hence, believing that Britain's moment of difficulty is their opportunity to grasp, they decided to exploit it and asked for immediate freedom (Chamberlain, 25-26). Thus, according to Lloyd, in spite of the fact that there were those among the Indians...
who were satisfied with the idea of a war against Nazi Germany, yet a large section of the Indian people were not satisfied, and even protested against being drawn into war without their desire and consent. Lloyd says that the congress: "...led by Gandhi, would inevitably have been distressed by the idea of any sort of fighting, and would have been supported by people who disliked the idea of fighting for the British Empire... [and] the central organizers of congress called on all Congress politicians in provincial governments to resign from their positions" (162). Therefore, resignation of all the 'offices' was the response to the Congress call. It came as a gesture of protest, after which the British found themselves standing alone searching for 'alliances'. The British, thus, found both the Indian princes and the Muslim League ready to offer them help: “…the Muslim League was building up its mass organization by developing a national spirit of its own. In 1940 it declared that it was in favour of Pakistan, the creation of a separate state for Muslims in north-western India” (Lloyd, 162-163).

The Second World War put the empire under immense strain, and, according to Lloyd, it "...greatly weakened Britain's imperial position" (163) especially with the threat of Japan. Therefore, the British were forced to enter in negotiations with the Indian people in 1940, and were compelled to offer them concessions and promises of giving India 'Dominion Status' after the war is over. But the Congress rejected this offer as, according to Gandhi, “a postdated cheque on a failing bank” (Lloyd, 164). Therefore, in 1942 Gandhi initiated his third massive movement that of 'Quit India' which, according to Chamberlain, "...demanded an immediate end to British rule and threatened that, if this demand was rejected, there would be a 'mass struggle'..." (27). In spite of the possibility of brutal repression by the British rulers, it was essential to launch this legendary struggle of the Quit India movement. Chandra argues that, although both Gandhi and Nehru had no desire to obstruct the war against fascism, they felt that it is essential to launch the movement because it was obvious that Britain had not the will nor determination to offer India any 'honourable settlement' during the war. Moreover, "...she was determined to continue India's unwilling partnership in the war effort". (457). Therefore, both
Gandhi and Nehru believed that "...any further silence would be tantamount to accepting the right of the British government to decide India's fate without any reference to the wishes of her people", and by 1942 the initiation of a struggle was inevitable (Chandra, 457-458). Hence, in response to Gandhi's call for Quit India movement:

...Government servants...should openly declare their allegiance to the congress, soldiers were also not to leave their posts, but they were to 'refuse to fire on our own people.' The princes were asked to declare that they (were) part of the Indian nation and that they (would) accept the leadership of the princes, if the latter cast their lot with the people, but not otherwise. Students were to give up studies if they were sure they could continue to remain firm till independence was achieved....peasants 'who have the courage, and are prepared to risk their all' should refuse to pay the land revenue. Tenants were told that 'the Congress holds that the land belongs to those who work on it and to no one else'.

(Chandra, 460)

The events of the war, the fall of Singapore, and the British withdrawal from South-East Asia and Burma gave signs of the forthcoming collapse of Britain's power. A feeling which in turn encouraged 'popular willingness' and support to revolt against and express 'discontent' towards the foreign rule (Chandra, 458). The Quit India movement, therefore, represented an 'internal challenge' to the British authorities to be an additional burden added to the 'acute external danger' of war (Lloyd, 164). Because of the stress of war, the Government was ready to 'crush' any mass struggle. After the launch of the 'Quit India' movement, being 'in no mood to negotiate with the Congress', it arrested all the 'top leaders' of the Congress, who were 'taken to unknown destination'; an action which provoked the anger of the people all over the country and resulted in 'instantaneous reaction' among them (Chandra, 460-461). The Muslim League, realizing this 'crisis' of the Congress to be their opportunity, decided to make use of it and offer their loyalty and help to the British: “...Conscious of its value to the British as a counterweight to Congress, the Muslim League began to nudge its way towards a final settlement of India that would involve partition and the establishment of a Muslim state, Pakistan” (James, 423).
The World War came to an end in 1945, marking a 'dramatic change', due to the rise of an immense anti-imperialist wave. There had been a disparity and diversity in the British attitude towards India and the continuation of its empire. While there were those who belong to the right wing Conservative party who opposed the granting of 'self-government' to the Indian people, the Left Labour party was more 'sympathetic' towards the issues of India and worked keenly to help India reach for self-government. According to James in his book *The Rise and Fall of The British Empire*, there were those members who belonged to the old school who supported the empire, and who wanted the rule of the raj to "...continue come what may", believing that "...Britain alone could keep the peace and act as a dispassionate empire, balancing the rights of one faith against the other", a belief which they maintained since the 1920s (412). Ever since 1929, discussions were around 'Dominion Status', which was finally and hesitantly given to India. It meant, according to James, that India would be given "...the same political freedom and detachment from Britain as was enjoyed by, say, Canada". However, there were apprehensions amongst the Conservatives about granting it to India, and Churchill, the Conservative Party leader, had so strongly opposed and struggled against any "...measures leading towards responsible government in India" (James, 419). They believed that the Indians are "...helplessly addicted to graft..." (419), used to be subjected and controlled, and hence, not responsible enough to be able to govern themselves. For most of the Conservatives, the Congress was "... merely a mouthpiece for a small clique of grasping and ambitious men who wanted only power". For Churchill, who had always showed his disbelief in the Congress and 'contempt' for its people, it was merely "... a political organisation built around a party machine and sustained by manufacturing and financial interests’ which was ‘opposed by all Muslims and the millions of Indians who were subjects of the princes" (419). With India granted 'Dominion Status', she might follow the path of other countries, like Ireland whose relations with Britain was 'tenuous' and fragile. There was a fear of losing India, and for the British the prospect of India taking the path of Ireland "...would have knocked away the chief prop of British
power in Asia and the Middle East" (421). On the other hand, there were those 'liberal-minded' people of the Left Labour Party who showed their "...friendship, sympathy and encouragement to the Congress Party", and who were interested and keen to connect with its 'intellectuals' like Nehru (James, 420). Unlike the Conservatives who showed their distrust in the efficiency of the Indians to govern themselves, those of the Left believed that 'educated Indians' should be treated as 'rational creatures' and they have the efficiency to '...exercise the freedoms cherished in Britain;' (419). Therefore, the British Labour Party, which was brought to power after the war, was more 'sympathetic' than the conservatives, and it was determined to "...hurry to settle the Indian problem" (Chandra, 474).

However, in spite of the fact that Attlee's government was 'committed' to grant India rapid and 'speedy independence', there were various problems which were 'formidable' and alarming and which stood as 'obstacles' to the British plans for India (Chamberlain, 27). The British realizing that they can not continue with their rule in India 'on the old basis for long', preferred a kind of 'graceful withdrawal from India'. The main concern of the British then, was to agree on a 'settlement' about the transfer of power to the Indian people, and to approve the kind of future and 'post-imperial relationship between Britain and India'. The British were willing to offer 'concessions' to the Congress, which would 'meet their demands', in order to reach an agreement that would guarantee 'good future relations'. But Congress demands were for the British to Quit India (Chandra, 491-492). Both the British and the Indians were willing to negotiate an agreement to set the transfer of power, moreover, the conditions were conducive to reach an agreement, but communal violence broke out resulting in the flow of 'rivers of blood' before India gained its independence (Chandra, 492). The British people sought to persuade both the Congress leaders and those of the Muslim League to 'reach an agreement among themselves', since the British were to 'withdraw'. But their offer of a 'federal form of government' was refused by both of the Congress and Jinnah, the leader of the Muslim League (Chamberlain, 27). Jinnah wanted to take Pakistan for the Muslim Indians, and he
"...decided that the Muslim League must show its strength and declared 16 August 1946 'Direct Action Day'". The incidents led to the break of communal violence which led to the death of nearly four thousand people (Chamberlain, 27). Because of the growing enmity between the Congress and the Muslim League, law and order started to break, and the British whose authority was declining realized that they are never expected or pertinent to stay in India 'indefinitely', for it would be “blamed for whatever went Wrong” (Lloyd, 172). Wavell's suggestion to Attlee that "Britain must either resign herself to staying in India for at least another ten years and commit the resources to do so, or fix a date for withdrawal and stick to it, even if this meant handing over power to the only viable authorities" was rejected. Wavell, thereafter, was replaced by Mountbatten who was to deal with the option that the British were to leave India by 1948 (Chamberlain, 27-28). The British, therefore, "undertook to grant independence well before June 1948, which persuaded Congress to agree to the partitioning of India and the creation of Pakistan" (Lloyd, 172). Chamberlain says that, this 'speedy' and rapid 'withdrawal' of the British, and their granting the Indian their independence 'had to be accepted', even if "...it could not be a satisfactory solution" (28). Therefore, it was declared by Mountbatten that independence was to be 'brought forward' from 1948 to 1947. (Chamberlain, 28-29). The agreement on forwarding the date of the transfer of power to the Indian people, it is argued, was because of the fact that the British people had the desire to 'escape responsibility' for this 'deteriorating' condition in India caused by the communal violence, and 'officials' were glad to 'leave the Indians to stew in their own juice'(498). Therefore, they finally withdrew from India, and Partition was the dramatic consequence.

Chamberlain commenting on the British withdrawal says that: "Britain granting independence to India was the first major example of a country which had not been militarily defeated relinquishing an important overseas possession after the Second World War. On the face of it, it was a disaster, ending in partition and bloodshed..." (29). From an imperialist view, the British people 'quit' India because they had finally fulfilled their task in helping the Indian people to govern and rule themselves, and that partition was
the "...unfortunate consequence of the age old Hindu-Muslim rift, of the two communities, failure to agree on how and to whom power was to be transferred" (487). On the other hand, it was said that 'independence' of India was 'wrested' at last from the British people by a huge 'mass' movement, in which a lot of 'communists' had taken part. However, the 'bourgeois leaders of the Congress', who feared the 'revolutionary upsurge', had to approve of a 'deal' with the British people in order to secure their own interests. Therefore, 'power was transferred to them and the nation paid the price of partition' (Chandra, 487).

With both the Soviet Union and the United States making their entrance into the war, it was clear that it is taking the shape of being a "world wide one, fought in every continent and every ocean". This fact represented a great threat to the 'structure of the British empire', and Britain was fighting to try and maintain its "...commonwealth and empire as they had endured over the decades" (Morgan, 559). In spite of the fact that Britain suffered various disasters which threatened its rule in India, like the "disaffection of the Congress movement" and the attack of the Japanese, it managed to hold to its power though with reliance on the United States (560). However, British imperialism suffered immense strain, especially in the 'Middle and Far East' because, according to Morgan, the American people, who opposed the British 'imperial system' were anxious "...to speed the process of decolonization", much to the disappointment and frustration of Churchill who "...was led to observe anxiously that he had not become the king's minister, or fought a bloody war for six years, in order to achieve the dissolution of the British Empire. But already his outlook was being overtaken by events" (Morgan, 561-562). Dissolution of the empire, therefore, seemed inevitable, and in spite of the fact that Britain came out of the war victorious, it was 'exhausted' due to the war conditions and the emergence of other international powers such as the USA. Lloyd says that:

Liquidation became steadily more likely as Britain had to draw on its credit, moral as well as material, to keep making its immense wartime efforts. Defeat during the last three years of the
war, was very unlikely but victory was bound to be accompanied by exhaustion, debt and the emergence of new forces and new powers that would not be easy to reconcile with empire. (165)

The war ruined Britain's economy, and it came out with heavy debts to the United States to the extent of losing its 'financial independence'. Furthermore, its empire became a burden and 'increasingly unsustainable' (Burns, 206-207). With the war coming to an end, Britain was left with concerns about the future of its Empire. Burdened with debts and 'impoverished' by the war, Britain was “unable to pay the social and economic costs of running an empire as well as repressing nationalist movements in their dominions” (Burns, 213).

In spite of the fact that there were those who entertained the belief that 'holding onto colonies was necessary to preserve any pretence of great power status', it was felt impossible to preserve the empire with all those challenges and especially "in the face of colonial resistance" (Burns, 213). Hence, the idea of abandoning and surrendering the empire was maintained and supported, “at least ideologically”, by those of “liberal and socialist political tendencies”. They rejected the idea of offering “sacrifices in blood and treasure to make an increasingly hollow claim to national greatness” and found it unimpressive (Burns, 214). During the years 1940-1945, Britain had generally shifted greatly to the Left, with those in the government who were more interested in the process of 'reconstruction' of their country (Morgan, 565). Their will and 'spirit' was more concerned with and concentrated on "housing and health, full employment, and industrial regeneration, on post-war imperatives rather than on external or imperial themes". A move which came as a disappointment for Churchill, and some of the conservative party members who worked and looked immensely for 'power and prestige' gained by the preservation of empire. But Churchill's calls seemed 'irrelevant' and "even an embarrassment to the Conservative Party" (Morgan, 566). McDowell argues that, after World War one there was a desire and a will to "return to the 'good old days', but after world war two and its dramatic aftermaths, the British people became more aware of the ailments and wrongs of their social life and there was a determination to correct them rather
than working to keep up the empire (169). Therefore, the decades following the ending of the Second World War witnessed, as Burns says, "...the decolonization of nearly all of the British Empire and the weakening of key sectors of the British economy" (Burns, 208). In the nineteenth century, there was no contemplation or attention given to the idea of Britain giving up or 'abandoning' its colonies around the world in spite of representing 'financial burdens', and this can be due to the "...importance of prestige. Great power status could be maintained by the possession of territory that might yield something of value in the future". However, the political development and "...the emergence of the great territorial states such as the USA, Russia and Germany prompted...that the future would be dominated by the largest powers"(Johnson, 186).

There was a general shift of the British attitudes towards its empire during and after the war. The depressing economic conditions resulting from the war and 'American anti-imperialism' rendered it, as James says, unattainable and impossible for the British to 'put the clock back' and perform in the same old ways towards their empire and colonies. The end of World War II brought a 'new age' and Britain was to grant her colonies their 'freedom' for which she 'fought' her war (James, 515). Demonstrators of empire, therefore, began to 'embrace ideas' which were to 'bring about the dissolution of the colonial empire'. By 1945, work started to be done to help colonies to '... slowly be transformed into self-governing dominions', and the British Labour Party worked towards granting India 'home rule' (James, 515-516). Consequently, James adds, there appeared a new tone and way of propagating for the empire. The word 'Empire' started to acquire that 'nasty' and bad 'sound', reminding them of "Nazi ideas of a master-race ruling others". Hence, the imperial propaganda' was amended and 'adjusted' to that new 'mood' in Britain, adopting a 'defensive', and even, an 'apologetic' sense (James, 516). James argues that the First World War had such an effect as to destroy British "jingoism"; their chauvinistic and prejudiced attitudes. The 'public mood' in Britain made it infeasible to 'resuscitate' and 'revive' the old 'Victorian and Edwardian jingoistic imperialism', which packed the British and
drove them to defy the world and even be ready to sacrifice anything for the sake of the empire. Before the war, this strong kind of 'patriotism' had such an 'intoxicating' effect on the British people and guaranteed the acceptance of war and the readiness to endure its 'losses' (428). The war did not only discredit this 'old imperialism' and made it appear to be 'out of fashion', but after WWI all the imperial 'heroes' became 'figures of ridicule' and their decisions were subjected to 'critical scrutiny' (James, 428). There were those who stopped to 'beat the imperial drums', and 'imperial issues' were took to the 'background' and other more important and 'pressing' matters took precedence, like 'the economy and the quest of international security' (James, 429). A fact which was of much disappointment and infuriation of many Conservatives, like Churchill who showed disrespect to Gandhi, disbelief in the Congress and unwillingness to grant India 'self-government'. He

… never wavered in his belief that the empire gave Britain its international power and authority, and imperial government bestowed peace and prosperity on peoples who could not achieve either unaided... 'It is when he talks of India or China that you member he is a Victorian,'...Churchill thought in terms of a carefully graded racial hierarchy, once remarking, 'When you learn to think of a race as inferior beings it is difficult to get rid of that way of thinking; when I was a subaltern the Indian did not seem to me equal to the white man.'... (James, 483)

Churchill was able to mange the country, and to 'guide' her during the time of war. At its most difficult time, when she and the whole of her empire, was encountering 'alone' the threat of the 'Axis power', he 'acted' in a way "...as if the empire would outlast the war and continue unchanged thereafter" (James, 484). However, maintaining the empire for an indefinite period seemed unattainable and impossible, and the 'temper' and attitude of British and the British people towards empire changed (James, 429-430).

The empire, as James argues, formed the 'backbone of Britain's power'. It provided Britain, not only with 'men and war materials', but it was an important and significant 'ingredient' of Britain's 'prestige', which 'counted' the most for Britain and made it a 'great power' (451). It was the most important for Britain, especially amongst those "races in the Middle and Far East", who
were aware of Britain’s strength and invulnerability. It ‘carried’ with it this ‘threat of force’, and was “…inseparable from the ability of Britain to square up to its enemies and beat them” (James, 453). Therefore, an event like the fall of Singapore, raised ‘wonder’ over the ‘overestimation’ of ‘Britain’s prestige’ (James, 453). As a matter of fact, the events of the late 30s and the Second World War had affected, and even 'tarnished', Britain’s prestige, especially the fall of Singapore which was a great blow to the British. Japan’s capture of Singapore, which "…had been built up as a great imperial fortress during the years between the wars" was, as Lloyd says, "…a heavy blow to British pride and to Britain's reputation in India". He adds that:

In India…Britain's reputation as an invulnerable military power had survived two years of set-backs against Germany but was suddenly exposed by this defeat. Indians who had seen Britain as obviously preferable to Germany were not nearly so sure that Britain ought to be supported against another Asian power. (Lloyd, 163-164)

According to James, those who were involved in "tracing the path of Britain's decline as a global, imperial power' came to realize that it is during the inter-war years that Britain found it difficult to maintain and support its "international pretensions" (454). British administrators and 'governors' were weak and almost 'unfit' to maintain the empire because of their morality and the ideas instilled in them. They were, as James says: “…psychologically unfitted to make the sort of decisions that were imperative if the country was to survive as a world power” (James, 454). The British tried, through their 'policy of appeasement', to help in the preservation of their empire when external circumstances represented a challenge to them. But it was revealed that British prestige was nothing but a front 'mask', which hides Britain's unstable and 'rickety' state (James, 455).
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**Essays and Articles:**

